El tejado de cristal (quebrado) de Europa

En Europe needs the ECB to step up to the plate, Paul de Grauwe expone con su claridad que le caracteriza la única solución disponible para el euro.
1) La crisis financiera ha creado una crisis soberana.
2) La crisis de las deudas soberanas ha creado una crisis bancaria.
3) Ahora se quiere recapitalizar a los bancos para "generar confianza en ellos". Capitalizar los bancos, forzarles a que su ratio de capital/riesgo pase de 5% al 9%, sólo puede lograrse:
4) Consiguiendo más capital privado (escaso, si no ausente); consiguiendo capital público; reduciendo activos (el denominador de la ratio de capital) lo que contrae, obviamente la economía.
5) La recapitalización con dinero público es imposible, pues eso llevaría una degradación aún mayor de la deuda pública... lo que pondría en jaque aún más a la banca. Esto tenía sentido en 2008 (como hicieron otros países, que se endeudaron para eso. Nosotros nos endeudamos sin sentido.
6) Sólo el BCE puede frenar esta desescalada imparable de Deuda-banca-deuda-banca:

To stop the downward spiral a floor has to be put on the price of government bonds in the eurozone and the European Central Bank is the only institution capable of implementing it. To prevent further drops in government bond prices, the bank should announce that it is ready to intervene in the market. The ECB is the only institution capable of doing this because it can create money without limit. In announcing its unconditional commitment, the bank would stop the spiral of decline. And when investors were convinced of the resolve of the ECB, they would stop selling sovereign bonds because they would trust that a floor had been put on their prices. The beauty of this outcome would be that the ECB would not have to buy government bonds any more.

Today the ECB does not reap this benefit because it has made it clear that it thoroughly dislikes being a lender of last resort and that it would like to stop as soon as possible. Why would bondholders, who are uncertain about the future value of their bonds, stop selling these when the ECB continues to signal that it does not trust these bonds either?

7) Objeciones a esta propuesta:
A) que aumente la liquidez y la inflación (¿y si de paso aumenta el PIB?). Según de Grauwe, no tiene por qué ser así:

Many objections are raised against the idea that the ECB should act as a lender of last resort in government bond markets. One is that it amounts to monetary financing of budget deficits, which in turn leads to inflation. This is unfounded. When the ECB buys government bonds in the secondary markets it provides liquidity, not to governments but to the financial institutions that sold the sovereign bonds. When these financial institutions sell government bonds they are in search of a safe asset, and this is primarily central bank money. That money is hoarded and is not used to expand credit and the money supply, and so does not lead to inflationary pressures.

B) Moral Hazard: que los gobiernos se desanimen en seguir sus recortes de déficit:

The only reasonable objection to a lender of last resort role for the ECB is moral hazard. By announcing its readiness to provide liquidity in the government bond markets, the ECB creates the risk that governments may reduce their efforts at cutting deficits and debts. That is why binding rules that would force governments to bring their budgetary house in order must complement the ECB’s role of lender of last resort. These rules are now being put into place.

8) Las alternativas que se contemplan EFSF son inviables: sus decisiones son por unanimidad; su capacidad es muy limitada.
9) Conclusión: el BCE no tiene excusas para no actuar como prestamista de última instancia. Y a mí no me parecería mal que aumentara el PIB nominal (PIB +inflación), de paso.

The ECB has no excuse not to act. In trying to keep its monetary virginity intact, the bank threatens to destroy the eurozone. If that happens, nobody will be able to profit from its virginity. 

Estamos en la penúltima hora.  Esto me parece lo mínimo. creo que habría que añadir un objetivo de segunda ronda: dar confianza a los inversores y creadores de empleo, diciéndoles que el BCE se compromete a subir el PIB nominal desde el ridículo 3% actual.