La oferta de Draghi: hago lo que puedo

Habrá quién se regodee de gusto con el programa de Draghi de compras de activos anunciado en septiembre 4. En cambio, supongo que molestará a muchos seudo economistas seudo liberales por aumentar los activos del BCE. Mi impresión es que Draghi no hace más porque no le dejan. Lo digo por lo rebuscado de los,títulos que se ha ido a buscar para no operar con los meta dos verdaderamente repletos, los bonos públicos.

Por los primeros comentarios en la prensa especializada, el programa no se puede valorar con precisión. El BCE dice que vendrá a reforzar el programa de préstamos a dos años:

Together with the targeted longer-term refinancing operations, the purchase programmes will further enhance the transmission of monetary policy. They will facilitate credit provision to the euro area economy, generate positive spill-overs to other markets and, as a result, ease the ECB’s monetary policy stance. These measures will have a sizeable impact on the Eurosystem’s balance sheet and will contribute to a return of inflation rates to levels closer to 2%.

Se trata de la compra de títulos privados (ojo, privados, no públicos, que es una de las líneas rojas marcadas por el Bundesbank y su mareiz el gobierno alemán, o al revés). Estos títulos privados son de dos tipos: ABS (Asset Backed Securities) y Covered Bonds. Son muy ofrecidos, y se dedo rendían e que los segundos suelen quedarse en el activo de la entidad emisora, mientras que los primeros son, como se sabe, susceptibles de ser vendidos o transmitidos a una entidad "Vehicle", ficticia, por lo que siguen siendo activos de la entidad emisora, normalmente un banco.
El volumen total se supone que elevará el nivel de la cartera de adtivos del BCE 1 billón, hasta los 3 billones que fue el máximo alcanzado en 2012. Pero hay dificultades debidas al bikini del mercado de estos títulos que entran dentro de la categoría de elegibles, como vemos en el FT:

1. Size

Mr Draghi hinted last month that the ECB would expand its balance sheet by up to €1trn towards the €3trn level last seen in early 2012.

The plan, as it stands, is that the ECB will do this over the next couple of years through its asset purchases and its seven remaining offers of targeted cheap, four-year loans.

The first of the so-called Targeted Longer-Term Refinancing Operations disappointed, placing more pressure on the ABS programme to deliver. The problem is that since 2008, the European securitisation market has been largely closed for business. And that could leave the ECB with a shortage of assets to buy.

A recent poll by Reuters put the figure for purchases of ABS and covered bonds at €200bn a year.

While the size of the market for European securitisation is a lot bigger than that, at around €1.4trn, much of that amount might not be eligible. (Though the ECB is also hoping the plan will lead to a pick-up in issuance.)

A continuación, el texto oficial del BCE.

2 October 2014 - ECB announces operational details of asset-backed securities and covered bond purchase programmes

• Programmes will last at least two years

• Will enhance transmission of monetary policy, support provision of credit to the euro area economy and, as a result, provide further monetary policy accommodation

• Eurosystem collateral framework is guiding principle for eligibility of assets for purchase

• Asset purchases to start in fourth quarter 2014, starting with covered bonds in second-half of October

The Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB) today agreed key details regarding the operation of its new programmes to buy simple and transparent asset-backed securities (ABSs) and a broad portfolio of euro-denominated covered bonds. Together with the targeted longer-term refinancing operations, the purchase programmes will further enhance the transmission of monetary policy. They will facilitate credit provision to the euro area economy, generate positive spill-overs to other markets and, as a result, ease the ECB’s monetary policy stance. These measures will have a sizeable impact on the Eurosystem’s balance sheet and will contribute to a return of inflation rates to levels closer to 2%.

The Eurosystem’s collateral framework – the rules that lay out which assets are acceptable as collateral for monetary policy credit operations – will be the guiding principle for deciding the eligibility of assets to be bought under the ABS purchase programme (ABSPP) and covered bond purchase programme (CBPP3). There will be some adjustments to take into account the difference between accepting assets as collateral and buying assets outright. To ensure that the programmes can include the whole euro area, ABSs and covered bonds from Greece and Cyprus that are currently not eligible as collateral for monetary policy operations will be subject to specific rules with risk-mitigating measures.

¿Será suficiente este programa de compra del BCE de activos bancarios?

La teoría dice que liberará activos bancarios "estancados", lo que dejará más recursos a los bancos para prestar dinero a las empresas y particulares. Pero hay dudas sobre si el volumen de las operaciones será suficiente para que, como piensa Draghi, la inflación vuelva a ser de "casi" el 2%. Esto del objetivo del "casi" el 2% no es un chiste, es una secuela de la arrogancia germánica con la que se fundó el BCE. Entonces se pensaba que el problema a matar era la inflación; pero lo que nos estrangula ahora es la deflación. Un objetivo de inflación del 3% sería mucho más convincente para los mercados y la economía, pero eso es un tema tabú.

Tras hacer una valoración de la economía muy amable - la verdad es que Europa está en la peor situación desde hace décadas: paro más alto e inflación más baja que nunca-, dice lo siguiente:

The annual rate of change of loans to non-financial corporations (adjusted for loan sales and securitisation) remained negative at -2.0% in August, after -2.2% in the previous month. On average over recent months, net redemptions have moderated from the historically high levels recorded a year ago. Lending to non-financial corporations continues to reflect the lagged relationship with the business cycle, credit risk, credit supply factors and the ongoing adjustment of financial and non-financial sector balance sheets. The annual growth rate of loans to households (adjusted for loan sales and securitisation) was 0.5% in August, broadly unchanged since the beginning of 2013.

Es decir, que el crédito bancario a las empresas sigue cayendo, lo que quiere revivir con estas compras de activos bancarios.