China y las bolsas, según...

... Mohammed El-Erian, después de decir que aparentemente, la reacción de las bolsas ha sido excesiva para los que pasa en China...

But this would be too narrow an analytical perspective. For quite a few years now, asset prices have decoupled from fundamentals as too many countries around the world have relied excessively on experimental monetary policies. And the more central banks were successful in repressing financial volatility through unconventional measures, the greater the amount of risk that investors took on — this in sharp contrast to risk-averse companies where, despite massive cash holdings, investment in new productive activities has been rather muted.

With central banks now on divergent policy paths, it has become even more urgent to close the gap between high asset prices and sluggish fundamentals. The best way to do so is through a more comprehensive policy approach that unleashes the productive potential of the global economy, addresses deficient aggregate demand issues, and deals with chronic areas of over-indebtedness.
This, however, requires political systems to step up to their economic governance responsibilities. In the absence of such a policy pivot, financial market volatility will continue to increase, causing bouts of price overshoots and contagion that could also harm the real economy.
While triggered in the short term by China-related concerns, what we are seeing this week on financial markets is, in fact, a broader phenomenon. It speaks to the gradual ending of a world in which central banks have been both able and willing to suppress financial volatility. The longer it takes for other policymaking entities to step in, the higher the risk of even greater financial instability and economic insecurity down the road.

Resulta un poco críptico, pero hay dos variables fundamentales que no se escapan: las bolsas están sobrevaloradas por una política monetaria laxa, que sin embargo no ha conseguido incentivar la inversión. Las empresas y los bancos han preferido mantenerse en liquidez.

Estamos en la fase terminal de un mundo en el que los bancos centrales eran capaces de maniatar la volatilidad. Otras instituciones han de tomar el relevo. Cuanto más tarden en hacerlo, más inestabilidad nos espera.

Los que esperen que los capitales que vuelan de China nos "arreglarán la vida", se columpian. Nunca la huida de capitales ha ido a otros mercados del globo si con ello han alimentado la incertidumbre y han agudizado la selectividad, es decir, la preferencia por la liquidez. Las caídas de las bolsas en 1987, 1997, 2000, 2008, no trasladaron el dinero de una a otra. Es dinero se metió debajo el colchón.