"How can I know what I think until I read what I write?" – Henry James


There are a few lone voices willing to utter heresy. I am an avid follower of Ilusion Monetaria, a blog by ex-Bank of Spain economist (and monetarist) Miguel Navascues here.
Dr Navascues calls a spade a spade. He exhorts Spain to break free of EMU oppression immediately. (Ambrose Evans-Pritchard)
Mostrando entradas con la etiqueta Mario Draghi BCE euro. Mostrar todas las entradas
Mostrando entradas con la etiqueta Mario Draghi BCE euro. Mostrar todas las entradas

viernes, 16 de diciembre de 2011

Más

Tim Duy en su blog habla de unas declaraciones de Mario Draghi (subrayados míos):
The Wall Street Journal has the story on today's speech by ECB President Mario Draghi:
The ECB's purchases of government bonds are "neither eternal, nor infinite," Mr. Draghi said in a speech in Berlin, stressing it would take "a lot" more than monetary-policy measures to restore market confidence in the euro zone.
Asked whether the ECB should copy the U.K. and U.S. in printing money to buy government bonds, a policy known as quantitative easing, Mr. Draghi said: "I don't see any evidence that quantitative easing leads to stellar economic performance" in those economies. EU treaties forbid monetary financing of government debt, he added.
This suggests Draghi believes quantitative easing should only be used if it delivers "stellar" economic performance.  This is depressing, not to mention severely misguided.  The appropriate metric should not be achieving a "stellar" economy, but what would have occurred in the absence of QE.  Hopefully, he will recognize this distinction should (when) the situation deteriorate further.
The combination of fiscal consolidation and ECB intransigence promises to keep the European crisis in the headlines for a long, long time.
Como poco...
¿De dónde viene esta mentalidad "cerrada"? Scott Sumner nos da una respuesta: de los años setenta, cuando se fabricó el modelo de la "inconsistencia temporal", un modelo que pretendía explicar la inflación sin empleo de los 70, que fue circunstancial, pero que se quedó ahí, en todas las escuelas, por su aparente éxito. Sí, se acabó con el keynesianismo, que acabó arrumbado, pero otras cosas también se arrumbaron a la vez. Mario Draghi es el perfecto clon de aquello. La otra fuente es Alemania y su paranoia, que encaja perfectamente en esa teoría y explica, en parte, la resistencia a cambiarla.
Sin embargo, aquellos autores, como Lucas y Sargent, que ganaron el Nobel, ahora han cambiado.
When inflation rates in most countries soared during the 1970s, economists reacted by developing ad hoc theories about why this was inevitable with discretionary monetary regimes and governments that had a short term focus.  The ink was hardly dry on all these acclaimed “time-inconsistency” theories when they were decisively refuted by events.  Inflation fell sharply all over the world, in good countries and also in countries lacking “discipline.”
But economists hold on to clever theories even after they’ve been refuted; after all, the world should work that way.  Thus the theories are still taught in textbooks.
And I believe this way of thinking may have helped to create the current euromess.