¿Por qué, cómo?

Es quizás el artículo más preciso que he leído sobre "El Problema".
En It’s time for plain-speaking to Europe’s electorates, Howard Davies explica muy contundentemente por qué y como hay que salvar al euro. (Este post puede ser leído en inglés en (http://www.thecorner.eu/archives/922)

1) Por qué: redenominar los contratos pactados en euro sería simplemente un imposible jurídico-legal de conecuencias funestas. Es la razón más poderosa, casi la única, para defender con uñas y dientes el euro:  No one knows today which euro-denominated contracts, which are found all over the world, should be redenominated into one or more new currencies. Would it be on the basis of nationality, or residence, or intended place of settlement of the contract, or law of jurisdiction over the contract? Who would decide? Which courts could enforce whatever was decided? In every case of redenomination there would be a winner and a loser, so every attempt to enforce a change would be disputed. Then arrangements for the new currency(ies) would be needed. Intricate preparations were made over many years to introduce the euro – we were involved. 

2) Cómo: antes que nada, no hay tiempo para otras vías: por el BCE: What leaders must explain is that, firstly, over the medium term there is no alternative to some form of federal fiscal arrangements. Second, that in the period before longer term fiscal transfer arrangements can be put in place, some euro area governments will need debt relief. 
And lastly, that the European Central Bank will need support, from governments and their taxpayers, to provide indefinite liquidity to maintain the machinery of day-to-day economic activity. This need not affect its operational independence. The ECB’s balance sheet will be extended and is likely to need support – which can ultimately only come from governments. Central banks are almost always ultimately backed by taxpayers. This need not affect their operational independence. Leaders must assure their electorates that explicit fiscal support for the ECB by eurozone governments, if it were needed, would only put the ECB in the same position as other central banks whose operational independence is unquestioned. In the rest of the world central banks support markets by buying government debt with the taxpayer, through governments, as ultimate guarantor of their soundness.

Until the eurozone’s leaders have explained to their electorates these four unavoidable facts we will all be going up blind alleys, when time is of the essence in averting potential economic and social disaster. (Dirigido a los Luis de Guindos de España, y al PP: no depende de nosotros).

The writer is a former chairman of the UK’s Financial Services Authority. David Green, a former head of international policy at the FSA, is co-author. Their book, “Banking on the Future: The Fall and Rise of Central Banking”, is published by Princeton University Press