Una teoría sobre la crisis

En macromarketmusings.blogspot, y sobre todo, en Monetarysuperpower.pdf, un bueno trabajo de David Beckworth & Al sobre la Fed como causa de la crisis por su "superpower" monetario.
El papel discute las dos teorías alternativas para explicar el exceso de ahorro mundial que se formó en 2004-2007 y que adquirió los productos financieros que poco a poco fueron deteriorándose hasta toxificarse.
Frente a la tesis de un exceso de ahorro autónomo (Bernanke), Beckford expone la tesis más cercana a Rajan, de que ese exceso de ahorro lo provocó la propia FED a través de un déficit exterior creciente que había que financiar. Hasta el año 2000, esa financiación era "sana", en el sentido que era capital  atraído por la gran eficiencia debida a la revolución tecnológica: capital a largo plazo estable. A partir de entonces, la cosa cambió.
Ciertamente, ese déficit excesivo era, en parte, originado por los tipos de cambio manipulados por los países asiáticos. Di ahí, por otra parte, el "superpower" de la FED: su política monetaria se extiende por el mundo porque los países exportadores se someten voluntariamente y acumulan reservas que luego han de invertir en dólares, todo para no perder competitividad. No sólo eso, sino que el BCE también acaba plegándose a los movimientos de tipos de la Fed, para que el euro no se aprecie excesivamente frente al $ (y al yuang). Por mucho que diga la Fed que sus decisiones son según su mandato y para la economía interna, el caso es que sus efectos se expanden por el mundo
-no por culpa de ella, ciertamente.
Es curioso que, así como acusa a la FED de haber originado el gran Glut financiero que fue el origen de la burbuja, también la  acusa de que en 2008 estuvo demasiado lenta en expandir su base, lo que contrajo la liquidez mundial, y eso amplificó enormemente la caída (ver más adelante párrafo c).
En los gráficos, pueden ver la desviación de la tendencia en el mundo de: dinero, activos financieros, y ahorro mundial en aquellos años, fruto de la involuntaria concertación de una política monetaria demasiado expansiva de la Fed y de unas políticas cambiarias que intensificaban y expandían el efecto monetario deseado solo para EEUU.

Yo diría que esa política cambiaria que potencia el efecto de la PM americana, puede
1) denunciarse y luchar diplomáticamente contra ella, o
2) tomarla como dato. Beckford  renuncia a 1) y dice que la Fed debe meter en su función de reacción ese efecto externo que luego se vuelve contra US. Destaco algunos párrafos de las conclusiones.

a) The evidence presented above, then, strongly suggests that the Federal Reserve through its influence on global monetary conditions created a global liquidity boom in the early-to-mid 2000s that fueled the rise of global economic imbalances. What appeared as a global saving glut to some was actually the global recycling of loose monetary policy from the world’s monetary superpower. The policy implications of the Federal Reserve’s monetary superpower status are considered next. 

b) The main policy implication of the monetary superpower hypothesis is that the Federal Reserve needs to be more cognizant of its global economic influence. In particular, the Federal Reserve needs to take into account when making monetary policy decisions that its actions get amplified into broader global liquidity conditions. Thus, in the early-to-mid 2000s the Federal Reserve’s sustained easing of monetary policy created a global liquidity boom that put the global economy on an unsustainable path. 

c) Likewise, in the mid-to-late 2008 as global financial conditions were worsening the demand for the main reserve currency of the world spiked. The Federal Reserve, however, was slow to respond to this dollar demand shock. This allowed global output to contract more than it probably otherwise would have. Being more cognizant of its global influence is not easy for the Federal Reserve given its domestic mandate. Still, the understanding that U.S. monetary policy can influence global liquidity conditions that can in turn affect the U.S. economy should give the Fed pause. 

d) What makes the Federal Reserve a monetary superpower is the fact that numerous countries peg their currency to the one the Federal Reserve controls. These countries do so because the dollar is the currency of the largest economy in the world with the deepest financial system. The Federal Reserve cannot control this decision by these dollar-pegging countries. It can, 

e) however, respond more forcefully to domestic economic conditions and by doing so better manage its influence on global monetary conditions. For example, had the Federal Reserve tightened faster during the U.S. housing boom it would have also reined in global liquidity conditions. Similarly, had the Federal Reserve responded more quickly to the weakening U.S. economy where the financial crisis started then the global financial crisis would have been less severe and the global dollar demand shock would have been muted. 

f) This is not to say that monetary policy that is best for the U.S. economy will always be best for the global economy, as many emerging economies learned in 2010. During this time the U.S. economy languished while the emerging economies were experiencing rapid growth.

g) The Federal Reserve, as a consequence, began a large monetary stimulus program called QE2. Though arguably appropriate for the U.S. economy it was way too accommodative for the dollar-pegged emerging economies. Not wanting to let their currencies rapidly appreciate against the dollar and not being able to sterilize all of the related capital inflows, these economies found QE2 to be too stimulative and inflationary for them. Still, they chose to maintain their link to the dollar.

h) Barry Eichengreen (2011) predicts that eventually the dollar will lose its reserve currency status and become one of three important global currencies. When that happens the Federal Reserve’s monetary superpower status will diminish too. Though that time appears far off, there are some signs that could be viewed as moving the global economy in that direction. First, because of QE2 the dollar-pegged economies are losing their export competitiveness. As noted above, these countries are getting higher-than-desired inflation with QE2. This is making their exports more expensive and defeating the very purpose of linking cheaply to the dollar. If U.S. monetary policy continues to be too easy for them over time it might make them less eager to peg to the dollar. Second, the ECB in early 2011 chose to begin raising its target interest rate. If it follows through, then the ECB may be finally moving out of the Federal Reserve’s orbit of influence. Though interesting, these developments may prove inconsequential for the Federal Reserve monetary superpower status. For the emerging economies still need the U.S. economy to buy their goods and it is an open question as to whether the ECB can really allow the Euro to strengthen too much against the dollar.

i) What is sure is that for now the Federal Reserve is a monetary superpower. It will continue to influence global monetary conditions and influence economies far beyond its domestic mandate. Therefore, it is time for Federal Reserve officials to acknowledge this monetary superpower status and act accordingly.