El Brady del FT

Aquí, el FT editorializa sobre la urgente necesidad de un plan Brady para Grecia.

A eurozone Brady plan could look as follows. First, Greece and its partners agree on a long-term fiscal path to sustained primary surpluses. Second, in exchange for outstanding bonds Athens offers a new series to fit the fiscal path, smooth out redemptions, and give a choice between maturity extensions and face value reductions. Third, the eurozone ends its rescue loans, instead providing collateral for Greek bonds. The easiest way is for the European financial stability facility to issue zero-coupon bonds and lend them to Athens, which posts them as collateral for Brady bonds of similar maturities.

Es la esencia de un Brady: ayudar al país, no con dinero, sino para que adquiera un colateral  que garantiza una nueva emisión, bajo un pacto o compromiso de mantener un superávit primario determinado. Esta nueva emisión llevará un tipo de interés menor pues no hay riesgo de quiebra. Incluso puede ligarse a la tasa de crecimiento. El acreedor en bonos viejos elegirá o una quita de su nominal o una prolongación de su deuda, a un menor tipo de interés. Trocará riesgo por rentabilidad. La deuda griega volvería a los mercados.

Such a plan has the most to offer both Greece and investors. Brady bonds will be rated similarly to the collateral – and the European Central Bank can accept them even if not – so banks can hold them to long maturities. This can save Greece’s moribund banking system and end contagion to other banks at a stroke. Some bondholders – certainly those who bought Greek debt on the cheap – will take hair cuts in return for liquid bonds. A well-designed debt swap could lock in current market discounts for Greece’s benefit. Tying interest rates to growth rates would align Athens and its creditors further.

 Como dice Eichengreen, es la única solución (ver aquí).