"How can I know what I think until I read what I write?" – Henry James


There are a few lone voices willing to utter heresy. I am an avid follower of Ilusion Monetaria, a blog by ex-Bank of Spain economist (and monetarist) Miguel Navascues here.
Dr Navascues calls a spade a spade. He exhorts Spain to break free of EMU oppression immediately. (Ambrose Evans-Pritchard)

martes, 15 de noviembre de 2011

La Fed y el BCE






En ECB-needs-Fed-now-more-than-ever, David Beckworth hace un sólido ejercicio: la Fed podría ayudar al euro, a través de la función de reacción del BCE a los movimientos de tipos de interés de la Fed.
En realidad, la Fed es el Banco Central dominante, y sus movimientos preceden a los de los demás (ver monetarysuperpower). En la imagen 1, se ve claramente que los movimientos de tipos oficiales empiezan el la Fed, y que el BCe es continuador de ellos. Lo que aún es más significativo, en la siguiente imagen se ve que el PIBN de USA adelanta en sus ciclos al de la Zona Euro.
SI la Fed expandiara su oferta monetaria, el BCE tendría que seguirle, si no quisiera que el euro se apreciara aún más y las dificultades financieras aumentaran.
Como dice Beckworth:
The Fed, therefore, should be able to help spur nominal spending growth in the Eurozone by do something radical, like adopting a NGDP level target that would return U.S. NGDP to its pre-crisis trend.  This would imply aggressive monetary easing by the Fed that, in turn, would put downward pressure on the dollar.  This would create the incentive for the reluctant Germans--who seem to care as much about their exports as they do about inflation--and the ECB to get serious about opening their monetary spigots.  In other words, a sufficiently aggressive Fed would provide the cover for the ECB to do what it needs to have done all along.  

Of course, a more efficient way to do this would be a coordinated effort, such as the plan suggested by Lars Christensen, where the major central banks of the world work together to raise their nominal spending to pre-crisis trend levels.  But since this type of coordination does not seem likely anytime soon, it seems natural for the reigning monetary superpower to take the lead and start a global nominal spending recovery.
Ciertamente, este tipo de coordinación provechosa es impensable. No es de imaginar a la Merkel diciendo, chachi, vamos a por ello. Por lo que he aquí una curiosidad más, como tantas que quedan de los años 30.




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