Tecnicismo leguleyos, misterios no aclarados, esperanzas vanas

Un análisis de detalle en Alphaville sobre la declaraciones de Draghi. Yo reconozco que no entiendo casi nada, empezando con que, según él, la deuda soberana no es un problema del BCE sino de las autoridades fiscales (¿?) y no sé qué de leches con el señoreaje. (El señoreaje es la renta que obtiene un banco central por sus operaciones de política monetaria. Básicamente deviene del diferencial de interés de emisión con el quede cine en la operación de retirada e liquidez, o algo así.)

The Governing Council, within its mandate to maintain price stability over the medium term and in observance of its independence in determining monetary policy, may undertake outright open market operations of a size adequate to reach its objective. In this context, the concerns of private investors about seniority will be addressed. Furthermore, the Governing Council may consider undertaking further non-standard monetary policy measures according to what is required to repair monetary policy transmission. Over the coming weeks, we will design the appropriate modalities for such policy measures.

Palabras preñadas de ambigüedades. No entiendo qué tiene que ver con el problema del euro, del hundimiento de la deuda. Etc. El autor del articulo dice:

That it would even officially talk about its seniority in the first place is a big change. ECB seniority has been veiled in the prerogatives of monetary policy, and the famous prohibition of monetary financing in Article 123 of the EU Treaty. Article 123 issues remain live: it’s why Mr Draghi once again batted away the sideshow of a banking license for the ESM, in this press conference.

“Addressing” seniority might have to mean some kind of legal machinery OK with Article 123. Not easy. But the ECB’s creditor status is one reason why its bond-buying made things worse and helped finance investors’ escape from Spanish and Italian bond markets. Removing or curing it could have a big impact on the real money’s asset allocations to the eurozone. Of course if it’s only “clarified”, or there is some rum, hopelessly complicated solution – such as inadequate fiscal resources being used to write protection on the ECB’s portfolio – we have a problem.

There’s the rub overall. Today’s statement could only say policies are in the design stage.

But again we find the view that this in itself presages disaster curious. It is simply extremely difficult to design asset purchases beyond the SMP that work for the 17 eurozone states as whole. This isn’t the Fed we’re talking about here. How should the ECB get round the fact that super-low German yields are screaming a transmission problem just as much as high periphery rates? If it’s so important to anchor short-term rates, should there be a yield target? How might you define any such yield corridor?

Those are all still speculative questions — but this is where the principles that came from ‘Draghi’s disaster’ could be leading. Some stuff was just plain worrying though, such as the idea that eurozone break-up fear is ultimately a fiscal affair. No it isn’t. Ultimately it’s getting uncomfortable how binary the outcomes have become. Either action from the ECB, or break-up at the door.

But in the meantime, all this action on Thursday does carry shades of how the LTROs were initially greeted…

Sabrán lo que están haciendo? Tantas vueltas a encontrar un tecnicismo legal, no es muestra de impotencia? Hagan lo que hagan, no será suficiente.

Mi interpretación: Graghi se vio pillado por sus propias palabras del viernes pasado, y necesitaba salir airoso de su renuncio ante las amenazas de los alemanes. Se ha refugiado en el leguleyismo. Todos estas revueltas no son más que cortinas de humo para que no le quememos en la hoguera como se merece. a

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