"Striking similarities connect Trotsky’s behaviour in the Bolshevik-German negotiations that preceded the treaty and Syriza’s behaviour in its talks with Greece’s creditors since the party took power in January."Trotsky used the peace talks at Brest-Litovsk as a forum to propagandise his message of revolution to the workers and soldiers of Europe, worn out by the first world war. Likewise, Yanis Varoufakis, Greece’s finance minister, and other Syriza policy makers have used the past five months to preach, over the creditors’ heads, to the European public about the need to end "austerity".
Para Gideon Rachman es una de las interpretaciones plausibles:
"The erratic negotiating style of the Greek government betrays the chaos in Athens. In part, this is a reflection of the inexperience and lack of resources of the Syriza team. But the party may also be trapped by the internal politics of Greece. Syriza is a coalition and the hard left of the party is likely to split off if Mr Tsipras is seen to accept austerity in return for a new agreement with Greece’s creditors. The broader electorate may also be none too impressed. Cutting a deal might therefore mark the end of Mr Tsipras’s political career."
Europa es una ideología, y el euro es la piedra sagrada, y ningún miembro quiere ser acusado de haber sido culpable de su caída.
Además, como explica Anatoly Kaleky, -y Varufakis no ha visto-, Europa está financieramente protegida por el QE de Draghi: es muy difícil que haya un contagio del bono griego a la deuda de otros países, si el BCE puede comprar ilimitadamente bonos de los demás:
Now Tsipras thinks he holds another trump card: Europe’s fear of a Greek default. But this is a delusion promoted by his finance minister, Yanis Varoufakis. A professor of game theory, Varoufakis recently boasted to the New York Times that "little Greece, in order to survive, [could] bring down the financial world," and that his media image "as an irrational fool… is doing my work for me" by frightening other EU finance ministers.
Apparently, Varoufakis believes that his "sophisticated grasp of game theory" gives Greece a crucial advantage in "the complicated dynamics" of the negotiations. In fact, the game being played out in Europe is less like chess than like tic-tac-toe, where a draw is the normal outcome, but a wrong move means certain defeat.
The rules of this game are much simpler than Varoufakis expected because of a momentous event that occurred in the same week as the Greek election. On January 22, the ECB took decisive action to protect the eurozone from a possible Greek default. By announcing a huge program of bond purchases, much bigger relative to the eurozone bond market than the quantitative easing implemented in the United States, Britain, or Japan, ECB President Mario Draghi erected the impenetrable firewall that had long been needed to protect the monetary Union from a Lehman-style financial meltdown.
Tyler Durden Nos cuenta el ultimo encontronazo entre Grecia y la UE:
What this means is that Greece came to Brussels and presented the same "not serious" proposals Tsipras submitted last week. That is, Athens is willing to deal on fiscal targets and is more than willing to accept free money from the EFSF and ESM (which would be used to pay the ECB on July 20) but is not yet desperate enough to concede to pension cuts or VAT hikes. That means there will be no deal for now and all eyes will turn to a scheduled meeting of EU finance ministers on Thursday.
As we noted earlier today (and on countless occasions previously), 'deadlines' and 'ultimatums' are largely meaningless because even if Greece misses its June 30 bundled payment to the IMF, Christine Lagarde would need to send a formal failure to pay letter to the Executive Board. Only then would Greece actually be in default. It’s up to Lagarde to decide when to send that letter and she would have at least 30 days. The set up for EFSF loans is similar, and besides, it seems exceptionally unlikely that either EU creditors or the IMF would put Greece into formal default while a deal is working its way through the Greek parliament, meaning all Tsipras really needs to do is get something on paper that has a chance of flying with Syriza hardliners and get it to the floor before July 20, when a payment to the ECB comes due.In other words: expect more contradictory headlines and more 'ultimatums' next week as this charade continues into its sixth month.
A más largo plazo -pero no mucho: antes de lo que imaginemos- la UE se puede encontrar con un problema griego en España, o en Italia, lo que seria indigerible si no encarrila lo de Grecia (encarrilar = vencer). La política del austerismo ha podrido a los países del sur, y en venganza estos han elegido gobiernos extremistas y anti-europeos. España todavía no, pero va por ese camino: el gobierno actual era el único defensor de verdad de cumplir con Europa (PSOE, uno de los puntales, ha demostrado que no le concierne cuando quiera rectificar será tarde). En todo caso, el gobierno que viene, mucho más débil, seguro que es mucho menos europeo.
Segundo, Grecia se está hundiendo económicamente, perdiendo capital a raudales, los que no parece importar al gobierno ( menos aún a los acreedores). Es de suponer que tiene un plan B para recuperarse cuando les echen de la UE, lo que pasa es que ese plan es de dudosa eficacia, aparte de la necesaria devaluación. Pero para que una devaluación tenga éxito hay que gestionar bien el periodo posterior, tener rigor fiscal y financiero, ganar prestigio crediticio perdido con la suspensión de pagos, lo que no parece ser del agrado de este gobierno.
Tercero, el desgaste acabará revertiendo ineludiblemente en el electorado nacional de los países líderes, especialmente en Alemania, electorado que está pidiendo a gritos que se expulse a Grecia.
Lo que se puede descartar es que se busque una salida de común acuerdo. Para la UE llegará un momento en que melle menos su prestigio la caída de Grecia que sostenerla a toda costa. Para Grecia, es muy difícil volver mostrando un acuerdo como una victoria.
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