En el estanque dorado de la banca

En Coppola, una melancólica valoración del estado de postración de la banca después de casi 8 años de crisis.
La banca no es lo que era antes de la crisis, y no volverá a serlo en mucho tiempo. la razón es que sí, hay mucho dinero flotando por ahí, aparentemente barato, pero no hay muchos motivos para ponerlo en movimiento. Ese dinero lo han emitido los Bancos centrales, pero se ha quedado estancado indoor el sistema bancario. Coppola utiliza una metáfora apropiada: en un estanque cuyas salidas están atrofiadas, por mucho que eches agua, será agua estancada. Habrá más, pero estancada.
No hay demanda de crédito, porque no hay demanda de inversión. El ahorro es muy superior a la inversión. La clientela bancaria está deseando depositar dinero para recibir un interés, pero el interés es en realidad  negativo: el banco no puede pagar interés, porque su margen se ha estrechado demasiado, pues las operaciones del activo son raras;  es más, tine que cobrar comisiones por la gestión de una cuenta, para reducir el coste de tener depósito, lo cual se parece mucho a un interés negativo, que es lo que recibe de sus depósitos en el Banco Central. Vean a donde ha caído el margen de interes de la banca en EEUU (gráfico de Cullen roche):

... There is indeed too much money in the financial system. It has been deliberately created by central banks to encourage people to invest productively instead of sitting on cash.  It has singularly failed, largely because no-one joined up the dots.

Putting more of it into the banking system therefore cannot possibly increase the flow of money around the system. It is rather like pouring more water into a stagnant pool, without removing the leaves and debris that have blocked the outflow and caused the stagnation . You simply end up with a much larger stagnant pool. So since they have destroyed demand for deposits and killed the interbank market with QE, central banks now have to introduce additional policy measures such as negative rates on reserves to try to improve the velocity of money. Governments, too, get in on this game, providing subsidies to banks to encourage them to lend and bungs to people to encourage them to borrow. These interventions have some effect, of course, but at the price of more and more state intervention in the banking system. It is, in effect, creeping nationalisation. 

Los días en que los bancos  pagaban por sus pasivos un 3% y cobraban por sus activos un 6%, tardarán en volver. Ni los bancos pueden pagar, ni consiguen que vengan clientes a los que cobrar con un marrgen sbre el pasivo.

The days are gone when bank managers borrowed at 3%, lent at 6% and were on the golf course by 3pm. These days, much of their lending is at far narrower spreads: deposits earn less, but so do the mortgages which make up most of their business. Banks face stiff competition in all areas of their business: for savings, from funds and asset managers; for loans, from online providers and peer-to-peer lenders; and for transaction services, from mobile money and fintech. It simply is not possible for banks to provide the services of the past and remain profitable.

Similarly, with lending, some customers will be unable to access finance at a price they can afford, because the lending risk is higher than the bank wants to accept. As a result of all this, some people will be pushed out of the banking system: for example, self-employed people who prior to 2008 would have obtained a self-certificated mortgage now cannot borrow to buy a house, and savers who want higher returns are looking at alternative providers. This is a feature, not a bug. Having safer banks inevitably means excluding riskier customers and those who want abnormal returns on savings. 

Todos los segmenos del pasivo (ahorro de los clientes: depósitos, cuentas de ahorro, fondos de inversión) como del activo (préstamos a los clientes: hipotecas, creditos de circulante, inversión, etc)...  han reducido su retribución. la razón última es que estamos en una economia estancada, como el lago estancado del dinero. El dinero no se mueve, salvo hacia adentro.
Y no se debe esperar que acabe el estancamiento en mucho tiempo, dice Coppola, porque detrás hay una demografía estancada.

We are now in a low-growth, low-inflation, low-interest rate paradigm, which shows no sign of shifting any time soon, despite the optimistic forecasts of central banks and other institutions. Low expectations of growth and inflation depress investment and encourage hoarding, both of which put downwards pressure on interest rates: while an ageing, asset-rich society increasingly regards the primary aim of financial management as avoiding losses rather than taking reasonable risks. Passivity is all the rage. Stagnation is not just due to QE - it has an underlying demographic driver. 

La culpa no la tiene el QE. Hay una cadena de causas que empieza en la recapitalización bancaria - que encarece su capacidad de financiación, pese al tipo de interés cero -...

"Lending at risk is incompatible with the regulatory reform agenda and with the desire of depositors for safety. The high margins and collateral requirements on SME lending since the crisis are because SME lending incurs a high capital weighting and banks are having to increase capital to meet tighter regulatory requirements. Banks don't want to take on more lending of a type which ties up a lot of capital. SME lending is not the only type affected, but it is the one that is most talked about."

... y acaba en la debilidad de la demanda de crédito. Es lo que Krugman llama una tramba de la liquidez, en la que por mucho que empujes la soga del dinero, esta no se mueve, simplemente se encoje. Lo que se necesita es un tirón de la demanda, del gasto, de la curva GG en el garfcio IS-LM de Hicks.