Alicia en el país de las pesadillas

La no cumbre de este domingo ha decidido NADA sobre cómo salvar el euro. Han dejado sus deberes para mejor ocasión. Esto se va pareciendo a "Alicia en el país de las Maravillas", una lección maestra de sadomaso para niños. La reina es Merkel, El gato que se esfuma es ¡yo que sé! nunca me gustó ese cuento, me daba dolor de cabeza.
Lo único que han anunciado es que los bancos deben "buscar" 108 mm de € de capital -sin indicarles dónde está enterrado ese tesoro- y que NO se amplía la capacidad del fondo de rescate ESFS. El papel del BCE como prestamista de última instancia, ni se contempla.
Otras "ocurrencias" que han desembarcado en la mesa han sido crear un fondo (otro) con participacón del FMI, para comprar deuda y garantizarla. Ha sido desechado por que su puesta en práctica es muy complicada. Finalmente, un decisión de estos genios del humor negro ha sido echar la bronca a Berlusconi, pidéndole más esfuerzo. A las preguntas de los periodistas, sobre la receptividad de éste, Merkel & Sarko no se han refrenado:

FT:

Yet Ms Merkel’s and Mr Sarkozy’s joint frustration with Mr Berlusconi was made dramatically clear at a joint press conference. Asked if the Italian prime minister had reassured them about his action to reduce his country’s debt level, they looked at each other with wry smiles, casting their eyes to the ceiling.

“We are conscious of the responsibility of all the authorities in Italy,” said Mr Sarkozy. Asked if she trusted Mr Berlusconi, Ms Merkel replied: “He is our interlocutor, and naturally we are relying on him.”

Me pregunto si estos se toman en serio  lo que tienen entre manos. A lo mejor es que han decidido acabar con el euro. Según Wolfgang Münchau,  Europe is now leveraging for a catastrophe. Cualquier camino que intenten que no sea que el BCE estabilice el mercado de deuda, es camino directo a la quiebra del euro. La alternativa de potenciar el EFSF es crear un activo falso, de suma de activos que no pueden  sumar más calificación que lo que contienen: es un "monoline", que pretende tener un AAA, pero que lo que hará será llevarse por delante los pocos AAA de Alemania y Francia.
Cada país importante ha ido trazando líneas rojas que no deben pasarse. Alemania dice NO a poner fondos (con razón: está endeudada también) NO al BCE; Francia dice NO a las quitas de de deuda de Grecia... Esas líneas rojas se cruzan dejando u espacio de maniobra igual a cero. Ellos mismos han tapado las salidas, Debemos estar preparados para lo peor. Y el mundo también. Ojo a la reacción de echar la culpa a los demás; los demás seremos nosotros, que no hemos reducido la deuda. Eso es una falacia, pues España era el país con mejores cifras fiscales, hasta la crisis.
Pero el euro ha sido una perfecta máquina de destrucción. Nunca pude imaginar que un modelo de predicción económica fuera tan certero. Premio Nobel para Martin Feldstein.

Añado algo de the-hole-in-Europe´s-bucket, de Paul Krugman, 99% lo mismo que Münchau:

It’s a vicious circle, with fears of default threatening to become a self-fulfilling prophecy. To save the euro, this threat must be contained. But how? The answer has to involve creating a fund that can, if necessary, lend Italy (and Spain, which is also under threat) enough money that it doesn’t need to borrow at those high rates. Such a fund probably wouldn’t have to be used, since its mere existence should put an end to the cycle of fear. But the potential for really large-scale lending, certainly more than a trillion euros’ worth, has to be there.

And here’s the problem: All the various proposals for creating such a fund ultimately require backing from major European governments, whose promises to investors must be credible for the plan to work. Yet Italy is one of those major governments; it can’t achieve a rescue by lending money to itself. And France, the euro area’s second-biggest economy, has been looking shaky lately, raising fears that creation of a large rescue fund, by in effect adding to French debt, could simply have the effect of adding France to the list of crisis countries. There’s a hole in the bucket, dear Liza, dear Liza.

You see what I mean about the situation being funny in a gallows-humor fashion? What makes the story really painful is the fact that none of this had to happen.

Think about countries like Britain, Japan and the United States, which have large debts and deficits yet remain able to borrow at low interest rates. What’s their secret? The answer, in large part, is that they retain their own currencies, and investors know that in a pinch they could finance their deficits by printing more of those currencies. If the European Central Bank were to similarly stand behind European debts, the crisis would ease dramatically.

Wouldn’t that cause inflation? Probably not: whatever the likes of Ron Paul may believe, money creation isn’t inflationary in a depressed economy. Furthermore, Europe actually needs modestly higher overall inflation: too low an overall inflation rate would condemn southern Europe to years of grinding deflation, virtually guaranteeing both continued high unemployment and a string of defaults.

But such action, we keep being told, is off the table. The statutes under which the central bank was established supposedly prohibit this kind of thing, although one suspects that clever lawyers could find a way to make it happen. The broader problem, however, is that the whole euro system was designed to fight the last economic war. It’s a Maginot Line built to prevent a replay of the 1970s, which is worse than useless when the real danger is a replay of the 1930s.

And this turn of events is, as I said, tragic.

The story of postwar Europe is deeply inspiring. Out of the ruins of war, Europeans built a system of peace and democracy, constructing along the way societies that, while imperfect — what society isn’t? — are arguably the most decent in human history.

Yet that achievement is under threat because the European elite, in its arrogance, locked the Continent into a monetary system that recreated the rigidities of the gold standard, and — like the gold standard in the 1930s — has turned into a deadly trap.

Now maybe European leaders will come up with a truly credible rescue plan. I hope so, but I don’t expect it.

The bitter truth is that it’s looking more and more as if the euro system is doomed. And the even more bitter truth is that given the way that system has been performing, Europe might be better off if it collapses sooner rather than later.