Dos opiniones: primero arréglese y luego cóbrese

En Bruegel, GB Wolff nos dice que las decisiones tomadas sobre Chipre han minado el futuro del euro. No que el euro vaya a hundirse inmediatamente, pero que han creado de facto dos monedas: el euro alemán y el euro chipriota. No valen los mismo. Si ud. deposita un euro en Chipre, será susceptible de ser inmovilizado, pues el pasado martes se tomó una resolución, con el VB de la UE, de una prohibición de transferencia de los depósitos a otros países del euro. Esto, aparte de conculcar el Tratado (no controles de e movimientos de capital), es la relación artificial de dos mercados compartimentos os. A medida que se extienda el problema, habrá un euro español, un euro intaliano, etc...

After the decision of last Saturday, an even bigger mistake is under way. Cypriot lawmakers have on March 22 almost unnoticed passed a restriction bill that allows the introduction of capital control. This step was supported by the ECB and the European institutions to avoid uncontrolled capital outflows that could threaten financial stability in Cyprus. The bill prevents simple transfers of deposits from Cyprus to other countries in the Eurozone without an approval by authorities, with the ECB playing a role in the approval process. It effectively means that a euro anywhere is not a euro everywhere. This is the single most important mistake made in the Cyprus crisis. Here is why:

¿Qué se debería haber hecho? Lo que en cualquier país soberano se hubiera hecho. Primero, garantizar la liquidez antes de que desaparezca, y luego rescatar la banca chipriota con toda la dureza que se quiera emplear, incluso tomando posesión de ella (es decir, cobrando después de arreglarlo, no antes):

What should be done instead? The eurosystem should provide liquidity to replace all outflowing deposits as long as collateral is available. Collateral standards would certainly have to be lowered significantly as otherwise collateral standards would limit the amount of liquidity that could be provided, a point I made almost 2 years ago in this letter to FT (Lack of collateral will stop euro flows). At the same time, the Eurogroup should agree to an ESM programme similar to the one in Spain with very intrusive European Commission powers in bank restructuring. De facto, the European institutions should take control of those banks in Cyprus that run out of eligible collateral. They should then do gradual bank resolution by selling assets of banks at an appropriate speed. Alternatively, if the value of assets is high, then the bank could also be sold to new investors. This will mean putting up more resources upfront but it may be not a big loss in the end as Cypriot bank assets cannot evaporate over night. If the ESM is effectively in control, it will improve confidence of the Eurosystem and allow for the type of liquidity provisions that will be necessary. Eventually, it will ensure that even in case of a collapse of the Cypriot financial system, the ESM would ensure the proper functioning of the payment system and essential banking services.
Taxing depositors should not be seen as the main mistake of this crisis provided those below the 100K are protected. In fact, it must be possible to get a financial contribution of depositors of oversized and insolvent banks – even though this contribution should ideally be received in an orderly bank restructuring process. But by introducing capital controls, the eurozone has embarked on a process severely endangering the currency area and the single market. A euro in Cyprus now has a different value than a euro in Frankfurt. De facto, the ECB has showed that it is ready to contemplate implicit limits to the Target2 balances. It is not too late to correct this mistake.

Ahora veamos la última columna de Wolfgang Müchau, que hay que leer entera. Para él, lo de Chipre es un clavo más en el tasas del euro. Confiesa que lleva anunciando el fin del euro 3 años, y que hasta ahora no se ha producido. Pero no ha sido por el buen hacer de los mandatarios europeos, sino por los trucos de última hora lo que le ha mantenido en pie.

What happened in Cyprus last week is not a deep cause of anything. But it is a perfect illustration of the eurozone’s collective action problem. This latest escalation began with the dangerous agreement to bail-in insured depositors. Eurozone officials are as legally literate as they are economically illiterate. Their ever so brilliant idea was not to haircut insured deposits of under €100,000, but simply to tax them. They did not realise that if they take away the promise inherent in deposit insurance, they are in default, and in danger of starting a bank run.

The Cypriot parliament was right to reject this mad deal. But the Cypriot government then committed three subsequent blunders. The first was the decision by President Nicos Anastasiades to seek help from Russia. Instead of working with the eurozone, he worked against it. The Germans, in particular, saw this as an openly hostile move. It was also ill-judged because the Russians rejected the offer. The second was the decision not to communicate with the European finance ministers and the euro working group for three critical days last week. The third was the Cypriot government’s proposal on Thursday to create a sovereign wealth fund backed by a raid on the pension fund and other state assets. On Friday Angela Merkel swiftly dismissed it.

What happened last week is a fitting example of European political leaders, in a most unprofessional pursuit of narrow national interests, failing to defend the common good.

Of those, the most damaging has been the policy of asymmetric adjustment through austerity. Banks in Cyprus are falling now because the Greek state and Greek banks fell earlier, and because the eurozone forced a private-sector involvement. In Italy, it was also austerity that turned a recession into a depression. That, in turn, transformed an anti-euro, anti-establishment protest movement into the single largest political party in the Italian parliament at the last elections. There is a good chance that its leader, Beppe Grillo, could end up with an absolute majority if Italy were to hold another round of elections later this year.

Ahora es difícil encontrar una rendija pare un nuevo truco. Se lo han puesto a si mismos muy difícil. Cualquier chipriota con depósito estará pensando como sacar el siendo de su país. Sin embargo, por la prohibición establecida - corralito- ni aún pagando la leva que se imponga podrán hacerlo. Ya haya facto dos euros. En realidad hay más de dos, aunque no tan visible: si el dinero deja de entrar en un país, ese país está en realidad pensando cómo sacar el dinero. Como sucedió desde 2010, como vimos en esta imagen.



Como ven, los depósitos han estado cayendo en España (y otros países), lentamente, desde que empezó la crisis, hasta que Draghi pronunció sus mágicas palabras -que ahora se ve en la tesitura de ser desmentidas. (Obsérvese que a medida que se rescataba un país, la velocidad de salida aumentaba). En todo caso, no creo que el BCE llegue a la elasticidad de la que habla Wolff, el primer comentarista, que implica rebajar el exterior de valoración del colateral lo que haga falta.

Estamos ante el dilema: soberanía monetaria nacional secuestrada, frente a unos ineptos recortes supranacionales. Pero no se vean que estos ineptos son substituibles: son ineptos porque obedecen a la máxima soberanía que es Alemania. Como dice Münchau, el problema no es Chipre, sino Chipre más Alemania, Grecia con Alemania, Italia con Alemania, demasiada asimetría que además se multiplica.