Atención! Llévense el dinero del banco!

¿Se acuerdan el caso de las preferentes de Bankia (y otras entidades), por el que ahorradores fueron esquilmados sin misericordia, al aceptar la conversión de sus depósitos en "preferentes"? Cuantos se que quedarin sin sus ahorros?

Pues no se preocupen más: ese es el modelo propuesto por el G-20 en su reciente reunión en Brisbane, de la que volvió tan orgulloso Tajoy.

Es el modelo "Chipre" o mal llamado Bail-in, jaleado por el presidente del Eurogrupo, aunque los efectos de sus declaraciones en los mercados le forzaron a desmentirse.

Pero el G-20 ha "retomado" el modelo. La teoría es que ningún contribuyente debe pagar vía impuestos el rescate de un banco: deben ser los acreedores, (salvo los acreedores séniors, como ¡el BCE!), y ello include los depósitos por encima de determinada cantidad. Dichos depósitos serían convertidos forzosamente en capitales de un banco en quiebra, pero esta vez de manera legal.

Como dice Bill Mitchell:

The terminology – bail-in – enters the discourse to replace bail-out. It first appeared in 2013 when the European Commission, the ECB and the IMF conspired on Moarch 25, 2013 to defraud the Cypriot depositors as their banks failed.

The Commission wanted to avoid any further general bail-out funds being provided to the basket case economies in the Eurozone having previously providing emergency funds to Greece and Portugal.

In the case of Cyprus, they decided that the creditors of the two prominent banks in Cyprus would bear the brunt of the bank failure. It turned out they included deposits of more than €100,000 among the creditors alongside the debt holders and the owners.

Noble propósito, lo que pasa es que la desbandada de depósitos que puede generarse ante la más mínima duda obligará a una rescate con fondos públicos mucho mayor. A los chipriotas les cogieron desprevenidos, pero la próxima vez -que habrá próxima vez- no lo creo.

El modelo "Chipre" empezó a cristalizar antes de ser formulado, es decir, con nocturnidad y alevosía, con las excusas más peregrinas:

At the time, it was claimed many of those who lost deposits were Russian money launderers. That was just a way of making us less concerned about what was taking place.

The elites thought they had found the magic rescue formula. On March 25, 2013, the President of the Eurogroup (Dutch finance minister Jeroen Dijsselbloem) issued a very terse statement – Statement by the Eurogroup President on Cyprus:

He was forced to make this qualification ("specific case") after earlier in the day claiming that "Cyprus would be used as the model for future bailouts" which of course was an "open invitation to any investor with more than €100,000 in a eurozone bank to remove it without delay, which some then did". (Source).

It was a typical European Commision/Council exercise in bungling. The sharemarkets started to frash, the euro depreciated and the cost of insuring European banks rose during the day, which then forced Dijsselbloem to issue the qualification.

But, of course, the plot was to use the Cyprus bail-in as a model for the future to further distance government from taking responsibility.

Bank deposits would now be confiscated any time the bank would face capital losses.

An insolvent bank could thus remain in operation by transferring deposits into capital.

We can no longer consider bank deposits to be secure (guaranteed by government). In the case of an insolvency process, they will be absorbed under these new rules, into the capital structure of the bank and dealt with accordingly.

No sólo los depósitos, al parecer los fondos de pensiones TAMBIÉN están amenazados de "capitalización". Ellen Brown habla de la muerte de los depósitos como dinero, pues lo normal es que poco a poco la gente se llene su dinero a casa.

Russell Napier, writing in ZeroHedge, called it "the day money died." In any case, it may have been the day deposits died as money. Unlike coins and paper bills, which cannot be written down or given a "haircut," says Napier, deposits are now "just part of commercial banks’ capital structure." That means they can be "bailed in" or confiscated to save the megabanks from derivative bets gone wrong.

Rather than reining in the massive and risky derivatives casino, the new rules prioritize the payment of banks’ derivatives obligations to each other, ahead of everyone else. That includes not only depositors, public and private, but the pension funds that are the target market for the latest bail-in play, called "bail-inable" bonds.

"Bail in" has been sold as avoiding future government bailouts and eliminating too big to fail (TBTF). But it actually institutionalizes TBTF, since the big banks are kept in business by expropriating the funds of their creditors.

It is a neat solution for bankers and politicians, who don’t want to have to deal with another messy banking crisis and are happy to see it disposed of by statute. But a bail-in could have worse consequences than a bailout for the public. If your taxes go up, you will probably still be able to pay the bills. If your bank account or pension gets wiped out, you could wind up in the street or sharing food with your pets...

...All this fancy footwork is to prevent a run on the TBTF banks, in order to keep their derivatives casino going with our money. Warren Buffett called derivatives "weapons of financial mass destruction," and many commentators warn that they are a time bomb waiting to explode. When that happens, our deposits, our pensions, and our public investment funds will all be subject to confiscation in a "bail in." Perhaps it is time to pull our money out of Wall Street and set up our own banks – banks that will serve the people because they are owned by the people.

Amenazar, con absoluta falta de sutileza, a los depósitos, y a los fondos de pensiones, pone en entredicho el sistema bancario, al menos el actual. Si tienes depósitos por más de 100.000 €, si oyes cualquier rumor tenderás a moverlo a cualquier otro sitio. Si es todo el país en que está en duda, a cualquier otro país (como pasó en 2011-12)... Si te dejan, porque en previsión de eso, se establece la colaboración de todos los países del G-20 para poder llevar el bail in a buen término...

Mucho más sencillo y barato sería nacionalizar (el)o los bancos malos, limpiarlos de gente y deudas, y luego reflotarlo vendiéndolo y recobrando el gasto. Pero es tabu, aunque mucho my eficaz.

NOTA: Esto no tiene nada que ver con el no-proyecto de Podemos de banca pública.