Dos conceptos de competitividad

Ayer veíamos el mostrenco dogma de la UE en el ajuste frente a los desequilibrios exteriores de los países "estresados" (PIIGS). El resumen era: comprimir y estrujar los costes salariales y los precios, pero aún así, podía no ser suficiente, si había rigideces que impedían el cambio de factores de los sectores productivos a los productivos. Ergo, hay que comprimir más.

Este simpleza esta basada en, como dice Roger Bootle, En un concepto falso de competitividad. El que sólo se basa en los precios a que se pueden vender los bienes en el mercado mundial. Estas variaciones de competitividad son efímeras, pues como el origen es monetario se pueden corregir monetariamente por una devaluación:

In fact, the word competitiveness is used in two different ways. The first is in relation to prices. If a country’s wages and prices go up by 10pc without any comparable improvement in productivity, while other countries’ costs and prices remain the same then, assuming that the exchange rate is unchanged, your goods (and services) will have become more expensive compared to other countries.

If you can pull this off without any adverse effect on demand for your output then it is a jolly good thing. Economists will say that you have improved your "terms of trade"; that is to say, the relative price of exports and imports. If you like, you will be able to provide fewer exports (and therefore have more to consume yourself) to secure a given amount of imports.

But most of the time there will be an adverse effect. By becoming more expensive you will diminish the demand for your stuff. In that case, economists will say that you have lost "competitiveness". As a result, net exports will fall and GDP will be lower.

In general, this form of uncompetitiveness does not last long because, as with anything essentially monetary, easy though it is to get into trouble, it is also relatively easy to get out of it. When exchange rates are flexible, then it is very easy. A higher domestic price level can be counter-balanced by a lower exchange rate. (Equally, though, it is easy for the supposed advantages brought about by a lower exchange rate to be offset by higher prices).

The peripheral countries of the eurozone suffered from a lack of competitiveness when they allowed domestic wages and prices to rise faster than the core members – and without having an exchange rate to depreciate. They are now in the process of becoming more competitive again by undergoing a period of falling wages and prices.

Pero este concepto es de patas cortas, porque tiene un resultado conjunto de suma cero: la mejora de la competitividad de uno perjudica a la de otro país:

In this instance the word competitiveness conveys something meaningful, because it is impossible for all countries to become more competitive. When one country improves its position then at least one other must lose ground.

When the peripheral countries lost competitiveness, Germany gained it. And as they have recently started to regain competitiveness, then Germany has lost it – which is one of the reasons why the performance of the German economy has recently been disappointing. But we cannot all get richer by improving our competitiveness, any more than we can by all of us agreeing to take in each other’s washing.

Pero hay otro concepto de productividad más importante, lo que pasa es que depende de factores muy distintos, que no se pueden medirse cuantitativamente y meterlos en la batidora de la econometría. Lo más que se puede conseguir es cualificarlos y ordenarlos, y hacer una lista de países según una valoración ya solo cualitativa, ordinal. Pero eso no obsta para que sea el verdadero concepto de competitividad. Se sabe que un país que funciona bien internamente suele tener éxito en el mercado internacional. Pero lo bueno de este criterio es que no acaba en un juego de suma cero, porque las ventajas obtenidas por una buena coordinación interna no agrede a la competitividad de otro; al revés, se puede beneficiar de la mejora de productividad del país competidor, se puede desarrollar mejor la ventaja relativa, no absoluta.

Yet there is another use of the word "competitiveness". This refers to all sorts of real characteristics of an economy such as infrastructure, the tax system, the education and skills of the workforce and the ease of setting up a business.

A number of organisations regularly conduct surveys of different countries’ competitiveness, interpreted on this much broader basis. They usually suggest that Singapore is somewhere near the top and Burkina Faso somewhere near the bottom.

Now this sort of "competitiveness" is a very different animal. It does have a similar aspect to the other meaning, because if one country has an advantage in infrastructure, roads, education, tax etc, then it will tend to do better in international trade. But the difference is that it is possible for all countries to improve themselves in this regard. What’s more, to the extent that they do, they will all be better off – even if some are better off than others.

What is being measured here is not competitiveness as such but rather the standing of certain key factors that tend to promote business and hence raise GDP and living standards. This is very much not a zero sum game. We can all improve ourselves.

Ahora volvamos al modelo mostrenco de los individuos de ayer, y veamos que lo que están haciendo es poner la carreta delante de los bueyes cuando hablan de que se ha producido un efecto histéresis y una perdida de potencial productivo, pese a la compresión de los salarios y al deflación. La razón: rigideces que hay que eliminar. Es decir, como diría Krugman, más "Pain in Spain".

Es totalmente a la viceversa: la contracción de la demanda interna, Y -y-, de los demas países, a los que se les ha obligado a lo mismo, es lo que ha producido la caída de la inversión, del empleo, la histéresis. Y eso ha hecho un daño casi irreparable a nuestro potencial. La transición de los sectores improductivos (ladrillo) a los productivos (exportadores y otros) se hubiera hecho mucho más ágilmente DEVALUANDO. El precio relativo entre sectores se hubiera realizado infinitamente más rápido.

A falta de la devaluación, imposible por el euro, una alternativa hubiera sido una política monetaria muy potente, para estabilizar los ríos de interés cero, pero no ahora, sino hace 7 años, cuando lo hizo EEUU. Ello complementado con flujos de fondos fiscales de los países acreedores a los deudores, para aligerar el desendeudamiento. No se ha hecho.

Por no hacerse, se ha llegado a una sucesión de situaciones críticas mal cerradas, que ahora esta en Grecia, pero que pase lo que pase con Grecia, volverá a producirse, porque un crecimiento robusto nunca será posible en el euro. Periódicamente estaremos atendiendo a una crisis, a menos que Guindos se equivoque, y la prohibición legal de salir de euro sea papel mojado, como sospecho.

Sigamos a Roger Bootle:

That is exactly what happened in Greece. But there was a difference. In most cases, the traditional IMF medicine counter-balances fiscal tightening with a devaluation of the exchange rate. The idea is that as the fiscal tightening squeezes domestic demand and threatens to cause higher unemployment, then a more competitive currency encourages net exports. Essentially, exports fill the hole left by the retreating government

But this was not possible in the Greek case because the country does not have its own currency – because it joined the euro. The only way of compensating for this absence was to allow domestic deflation of prices to produce an "internal devaluation". What a laugh! We learned in the 1930s that this does not work. Deflation is extremely slow and painful and, even if it succeeded in improving competitiveness, it would worsen the debt ratio because it reduces the money value of GDP (the denominator of the ratio). The result is that Greece is on the road to misery, with no obvious escape.

Why don’t the Germans understand the logic of this argument? They tend to look at matters with regard to debt – and economic policy more generally – moralistically. The Greek public sector has been wasteful in the extreme and Greek taxpayers have treated paying tax as near-voluntary. Accordingly, they have had it coming to them. When they reform themselves, then the economy will bounce back.

I am speechless at this attitude. Yes, the Greek public sector has been appallingly wasteful and making it less so is an important part of boosting Greece’s sustainable growth rate. But the current priority is not that, but boosting Greece’s actual growth rate now – and that is all about demand. There is no such thing as a free spending cut. Even tax evaders and under-employed public servants go shopping.

Why do the IMF and the other lenders persevere with this destructive path? The answer is IMP: "It’s mostly political." That is to say, it is driven by the overriding will to keep the euro on the road.

By now you should know my answer. Greece should come out of the euro and allow its new currency to depreciate sharply, perhaps by 30pc to 40pc.

Roger Bootle is executive chairman of Capital Economics

roger.bootle@capitaleconomics.com

Yo creo también que Grecia debe salir del euro para devaluar. Es más, creo que habrá que ayudarla a hacerlo sin traumas. De todos formas, habrá más situaciones críticas. Recurrentemente.