"How can I know what I think until I read what I write?" – Henry James


There are a few lone voices willing to utter heresy. I am an avid follower of Ilusion Monetaria, a blog by ex-Bank of Spain economist (and monetarist) Miguel Navascues here.
Dr Navascues calls a spade a spade. He exhorts Spain to break free of EMU oppression immediately. (Ambrose Evans-Pritchard)

viernes, 29 de julio de 2016

Mea culpa, mea culpa, mea máxima culpa... Pero no tanto

El FMI, en un informe interno, 

 

ha entonado una confesión de errores encadenados en los rescates en los que participó en la crisis del euro, según nos cuenta aquí Ambrose Evans-Prichard. Lo que le faltaba al euro: un reconocimiento explícito, negro sobre blanco, de que no se podía hacer nada con la "infamia de la devaluación competitiva", pues sencillamente no se puede recuperar un 30% de competitividad a base de contraer la demanda interna, lo que lanza exponencialmente la deuda acumulada. Cuando el problema es una Debt Deflation, justo lo que se necesita es lo contrario: aumentar la demanda interna, que el estado absorba con su deuda la deuda privada, y que la inflación resurja para reducir el peso real de la deuda/PIB. Dice Ambrose E-P, 

TThe International Monetary Fund’s top staff misled their own board, made a series of calamitous   misjudgments in Greece, became euphoric cheerleaders for the euro project, ignored warning signs of impending crisis, and collectively failed to grasp an elemental concept of currency theory. 

This is the lacerating verdict of the IMF’s top watchdog on the fund’s tangled political role in the eurozone debt crisis, the most damaging episode in the history of the Bretton Woods institutions. 

It describes a “culture of complacency”, prone to “superficial and mechanistic” analysis, and traces a shocking breakdown in the governance of the IMF, leaving it unclear who is ultimately in charge of this extremely powerful organisation. 

Tremenda confesión que ciertamente se agradece, aunque las amargas víctima de los fallos -véase Grecia-  no se consolarán por eso. 

"In an astonishing admission, the report said its own investigators were unable to obtain key records or penetrate the activities of secretive "ad-hoc task forces". Mrs Lagarde herself is not accused of obstruction.

“Many documents were prepared outside the regular established channels; written documentation on some sensitive matters could not be located. The IEO in some instances has not been able to determine who made certain decisions or what information was available, nor has it been able to assess the relative roles of management and staff," it said.

El informe independiente no se muerde la lengua a la hora de buscar los orígenes de la sumisión -porque es una sumisión- del FMI a los dogmas de las bondades ilimitadas del euro:

The report said the whole approach to the eurozone was characterised by “groupthink” and intellectual capture. They had no fall-back plans on how to tackle a systemic crisis in the eurozone – or how to deal with the politics of a multinational currency union – because they had ruled out any possibility that it could happen.

“Before the launch of the euro, the IMF’s public statements tended to emphasise the advantages of the common currency," it said. Some staff members warned that the design of the euro was fundamentally flawed but they were overruled.

“After a heated internal debate, the view supportive of what was perceived to be Europe’s political project ultimately prevailed,” it said.

This pro-EMU bias continued to corrupt their thinking for years. “The IMF remained upbeat about the soundness of the European banking system and the quality of banking supervision in euro-area countries until after the start of the global financial crisis in mid-2007. This lapse was largely due to the IMF’s readiness to take the reassurances of national and euro area authorities at face value,” it said.

The IMF persistently played down the risks posed by ballooning current account deficits and the flood of capital pouring into the eurozone periphery, and neglected the danger of a "sudden stop" in capital flows.

El Sudden Stop, cuyo momento álgido de máximo riesgo fue el año 2012, el de la crisis de los bonos, se convirtió en una crisis de creciente desequilibrios exteriores entre países del euro, desequilibrios que han seguido aumentando. El BCE de Draghi frenó la sangría, y salvo al euro de uña norte cantada. Pero los problemas de fondo que genera el invento no se han solucionado. 
Recuerden lo que día  hace unos post sobre que de nuevo hay indicios de fuga de dinero en Italia y España en los débitos y créditos acumulados en el Target2, o cámara de comercio pensarían interbancaria del euro. 
 
 
http://www.miguelnavascues.com/2016/07/target-2-prosiguen-las-huidas-de.html

Lo mejor, el comentario de Christine Lagarde al IEO:

Overall, the conclusion I draw is that the Fund’s involvement in the Euro Area crisis programs has been a qualified success.  

 ¡Eso sí que es el paradigma del eufemismo! 



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