El sueño de Sarko

Voy a ponerme un poco pesado insistiendo en el nuevo plan del BCE para ampliar la financiación a los bancos. Pero es que se trata del primer movimiento que ha hecho la institución en el sentido adecuado, pero con una mezquindad que puede hacerlo insuficiente para desatascar el nudo cada vez más cerrado al que nos enfrentamos. Un nudo "gordiano", al que le falta un Alejandro Magno que lo corte de un tajo, facilitando liquidez a todo el mundo sin condiciones. Cuando los riesgos alternativos son estabilidad duradera del euro o una profunda depresión y ruptura segura del mismo, se necesita decisión.
El BCE (susurrado por Merkozy) ha dispuesto una línea de crédito a 3 años al 1% a los bancos con generosa definición del colateral de garantía. Bien, es un paso, pero ¿suficiente?
Según Sarkozy (aquí) el nuevo dispositivo del BCE (préstamos a 3 años a la banca, con 1% de coste, con colateral de bonos públicos):

“Italian banks will be able to borrow [from the ECB] at 1 per cent, while the Italian state is borrowing at 6-7 per cent. It doesn’t take a finance specialist to see that the Italian state will be able to ask Italian banks to finance part of the government debt at a much lower rate.”

Palabras llenas de suficiencia que desvelan el criterio económico de este individuo: Los gobiernos pueden pedir (es decir, forzar) a sus bancos  a financiar "parte" de sus deudas flotantes a menores tipos de interés...
Incluso hay gente seria como Tyler Cowen que "compra" el argumento.
Ya he expuesto mis dudas en  El-plan-draghi. Pero hay un montón de blogs echando humo y ofreciendo ideas más que interesantes, por lo que les hago un resumen de links y de opiniones sobre este interesante tema:
Fibs and Waves, da un análisis muy completo, escéptico también, del que destaco:

Furthermore, this approach to QE increases concentration risk enormously.  By providing incentives to Eurozone banks to conduct this carry trade, they become the willing buyers of EMU sovereign debt holdings put on offer by foreign banks, and crowd foreign banks out of the bid on new issues.

Another concern has to do with domestic lending within the EMU.  If bank balance sheets become even further encumbered with sovereign debt, how much funding does this leave remaining for non-governmental lending?  After all, how does growth return with governments hell-bent on austerity and credit being allocated towards a carry trade instead of business expansion?

 En Why ECB lending won’t solve the euro crisis,

But in this case, it’s not going to happen. Why? For one thing, the main tool that governments can use has already been deployed: if banks load up on sovereign debt, it carries a lower risk weighting under Basel rules and therefore makes their risk-adjusted capital ratios look more attractive. But that’s been the case for decades now, and it can’t be beefed up at all. Meanwhile, bank regulators and investors are looking at a lot of other ratios too, like total leverage. And as we saw with MF Global, they’re hyper-aware of European sovereign exposures these days. Any bank wanting to be considered healthy will stay well away from Spanish and Italian debt.

On top of that, the financing needs of Spain and Italy are much bigger than their respectivenational banks can fill — especially in the context of those banks trying to deleverage, and seeing their deposit bases move steadily to safer European countries. While national governments are reasonably good at twisting the arms of their own domestic banks and forcing those banks to lend to their sovereigns, they’re much less good at twisting the arms of foreign banks and getting them to do the same thing. Is there any way at all for the Italian government to persuade French banks to lend to it? No.

And more generally, the national debt of big European sovereigns like Italy and Spain is so enormous that it has to be held broadly, in bonded form, by individuals and institutions. Banks alone won’t suffice. Greece is small enough that most of its debt can be held by banks. Italy, not so much.

There’s an argument that it doesn’t really matter whether the banks buy Italian and Spanish debt or not: the main thing that matters is that the ECB is printing money, which is entering the system via the banking system, and which will ultimately find its way into sovereign coffers one way or another, especially since there’s precious little demand for commercial bank loans these days. But I don’t buy it: there’s a virtually infinite number of potential investment opportunities around the world, and there’s no good reason to believe that the ECB’s cash is going to wind up funding Italy’s deficit rather than, say, getting invested in Facebook stock.

Yo resumiría de nuevo las dudas en una: ¿va a emitirse dinero suficiente para salvar a los bancos, y  a las deudas soberanas, y además al sector privado? Lo dudo por las palabras de Draghi, que repito:

Mr Draghi said the programme would remain justified as long as the financial market “channels” by which its interest rate decisions are transmitted to the real economy remained “seriously impaired”. However, he stressed the EU ban on central bank funding of governments. Asked if that set limits on the ECB’s bond buying, Mr Draghi instead emphasised the need to ensure governments were “trusted on fiscal discipline and structural reforms”.

He hinted he opposed the ECB setting target limits for eurozone government bond yields or for the spread between the interest rate on German and other eurozone government debt. “Monetary policy cannot do everything,” he warned.

Mr Draghi also appeared to rule out US or UK style “quantitative easing” – embarking on large government bond purchases to boost economic growth – even if the eurozone fell into a deep recession. “The important thing is to restore the trust of the people – citizens as well as investors – in our continent. We won’t achieve that by destroying the credibility of the ECB.”

De lo que se infiere que Sarko no tiene ni pajolera idea de economía, como cualquier francés que se precie, y que de nuevo él y su amiga alemana van por detrás de los acontecimientos.