Con papel de fumar

Si hay una gilipollez que atente contra Occidente (o al menos a la estabilidad de Europa) es el euro y la manera como se la cogen con papel de fumar sus gestores. Occidente -por lo menos su tierra de origen) se está hundiendo por eso. No exagero un ápice.

http://www.economist.com/economics

Resulta que Grecia está al borde del precipicio (y nosotros, posiblemente). Resulta  que hay un rescate de 130 mm preparado, pero cada vez más condicionado por los prestamistas (UE y FMI). Resulta que, en esta tesitura, el BCE se pone finolis y exige que los bonos que tiene de Grecia, se los cambien por otros nuevos, por el mismo valor,  pero además super-protegidos contra futura quitas. ¿Motivo? no quiere tener pérdidas. Resulta que Draghi ha inventado lo de los LTROs a tres años (prestamos a la banca para que esta sea la que compre deuda) porque está en contra, aborrece, paranoicamente, tener e sus activos bonos de dudosa trayectoria.
Pues es, sencillamente, la muerte del euro. Si un Banco Central se niega a comprar bonos de su gobierno, a ese gobierno le quedan 5 minutos de telediario.  Todo esto además no tiene sentido económico.
Un banco central NO puede tener pérdidas, es imposible. Y es imposible porque tiene el monopolio de emisión. Un BC no se ha de endeudar par financiarse, sólo tiene que emitir dinero; el único riesgo es inflacionario, pero tampoco es un riesgo cierto, pues tiene capacidad para compensar el aumento de circulación. Un banco privado puede quebrar; tiene pasivos que ha de cumplir. Un BC no.
By the way, por eso digo que la salvación del euro radica en la inflación, inevitablemente.
Gillian Tett aprovecha el tema par escojonarse del BCE y de Draghi. Lo compara con un caso similar en Japón, en el que el BdJ encajó pérdidas por un grupo que salvó y luego quebró. Hubo hara-kiris, suicidios de vergüenza de algunos burócratas, pero el BdJ no se hundió, naturalmente. Un impulso sentimental/burocrático, como dice Gillian.
Se entiende ahora el ultraconservadurismo del BdJ.
Esa "sensibilidad" es el sumun de la incompetencia que nos va a llevar a un estallido antes de que nos demos cuenta. Como la delicadeza con la que están metiendo presión a Grecia para que ceda su soberanía casi totalmente. SI los griegos no estallan de indignación, seguirán apretando las tuercas sin que eso nos sirva para nada en años.
El agujero negro sigue acelerando su formación.

 A continuacion, un analisis luy completo de " http://blankfiendsew.blogspot.com/2012/02/ecb-road-not-taken.html " sobre la "astonishing" actitud del BCE sobre sus bonos griegos que quiere "sawpear" para no registrar perdidas.

It is my understanding that the ECB has hatched a plan to exchange its nominal 55bn euros of GGB's with Greece at par value for new bonds which would have some type of indemnification against loss, and immunity from any retroactive CAC's.  These new bonds would then be distributed to the NCB's that are the shareholders of the ECB.  What the NCB's would do with them is not yet known.

There are several important inferences we can draw from this move by the ECB.

1. The ECB is serious about not allowing monetary financing of sovereigns.  A choice to sell the bonds either back to Greece, or to the EFSF, at anything less than par would have been just that.  Still looking for ECB Fed/BOE/BOJ style QE?  Stick a fork in it!
2. The ECB is loss averse, and is trying to establish itself as a super-senior creditor on par with the IMF.  There is no precedent for a central bank to make such a claim, which is part of the reason their lending is usually very short term.  What the ECB is attempting to do goes against the precedents set by the Paris Club and may not be defensible. 
3. It puts the PSI deal at great risk.  At the very least, it may incentivize PSI-ravaged private bondholders to seek legal remedy, as it means a larger haircut for the private sector if the public sector can claim loss immunity.
4. It blows a mile-wide hole into the defensibility of retroactive CAC's.  Retroactive CAC's are a highly experimental concept to begin with.  What is the legal precedent that would allow the ECB to pull off some type of exchange that gives it "non-CAC-able" bonds at par value?  If I happened to be an evil hedge fund manager holding GGB's, I might be inclined to ask this very question in court. 
5. If the precedent holds, it would likely have a very chilling effect on private sector investment in any sovereign in which the ECB has holdings.  This has implications for Spain and Italy, as well as for EZ-wide sovereign debt should the ECB launch QE based on capital keys.  Furthermore, it may have a chilling effect on IMF participation, particularly if the concept of some type of public sector seniority were to be overturned in the legal system.
6. By extension of point 5, it may have a chilling effect on bank sovereign debt purchases in the next LTRO, particularly in those countries in which the ECB has conducted extensive bond purchases through its SMP.
7. It speaks to the loss aversion of the EFSF.  The fact that the bonds were not swapped with the EFSF, with haircuts subsequently taken by the EFSF, speaks volumes.  EFSF loans are NOT bailouts - they are blood claims.  They are a claim on your virgins, more akin to ransom than to a loan!
8. In of itself, this move does absolutely nothing to reduce Greece's debt burden.  It remains to be seen what the NCB's could or would do in this regard, once they obtain the bonds from the ECB.  The NCB's that would have the greatest self-interest in seeing Greece's debt burden reduced are also the NCB's least able to fore go potential profits.
9. It highlights the lack of a federalized profit and loss distribution system in the Eurozone, which is really the core of the current problem.

For those looking for a "count," for whatever they may worth, my general thought is that we are seeing the kick off of the final fifth wave of minuette degree of the rally that really began in August.