Paul De Grauwe, y el erróneo concepto del BCE

Hace un par de días, De Grauwe publicó un articulo sobre la Cumbre ( del que se hace exo Martin Wolf)Lo más interesante es su critica al nuevo esquema de apoyo a los mercados de deuda soberana, que se operarán desde el fondo de rescate EMS, al igual que el rescate bancario. La critica es sencilla: el EMS tiene un tope de recursos de 500 mm de €. Si en algún momento se vuelve a producir una crisis de deuda española, los especuladores saben que es cuestión de empujar para que el EMS se quede sin sus recursos; en otras palabras, es una incitación a la especulación sin riesgo, puesto que tarde o temprano la pieza caerá en el zurrón. Todas las crisis cambiarías se han resuelto cuando el banco central había agotado sus divisas defendiendo la paridad. Al final, liquidadas las reservas - que siempre son una ínfima parte del dinero en circulación- la divisa devaluaba. Hay modelos añejos sobre esto de Krugman, con los que ganó el premio Nobel.

A esto, responde De Grauwe, la única solución es que de las compras de bonos se encargara el único que tiene recursos ilimitados, el BCE. Pero, como hemos visto recientemente, el BCE se hizo bajo el falso concepto que debería guiarse por el criterio de preservar su capital. Esto, dice de Grauwe, es inconcebible en una entidad que emite su propios recursos, y cuya única preocupación debería er la estabilidad real (precios) y financiera. ¡No hay banco central en el mundo que se preocupe por recapitalizase! Sus palabras son muy informativas (subrayados míos):

The ECB is unwilling to stabilise financial markets this way. Many arguments have been given why the ECB should not be a lender of last resort in the government bond markets. Many of them are phony (see De Grauwe 2011, Wyplosz 2011). Some are serious like the moral hazard risk. The latter, however, should be taken care of by separate institutions aimed at controlling excessive government debts and deficits. These are in the process of being set up (European Semester, Fiscal Pact, automatic sanctions, etc.). This disciplining and sanctioning mechanism should then relieve the ECB of its fears of moral hazard (a fear it did not have when it provided €1,000 billion to banks at a low interest rate).

Understanding the ECB’s reluctance

The deeper reason for the ECB’s reluctance to be a lender of last resort in the government bond market has to with its business model. This is a model whereby one of the ECB’s main concerns is the defence of its balance-sheet quality. That is, a concern about avoiding losses and showing positive equity – even if that leads to financial instability.

When the ECB was instituted, it was deemed necessary for that institution to issue equity to be held by the EU-governments. Thus the idea was created that in order to sustain its activities the ECB needed to obtain the capital of the member countries. This idea was reinforced in 2010 when a decision was taken by the Governing Council to raise the amount of capital by €5 billion. It is useful to read the justification of this decision: “Taking into account the increase of the ECB’s balance sheet total over the last years, it is considered necessary to increase the ECB’s capital by €5,000 million in order to sustain the adequacy of the capital base needed to support the operations of the ECB” (ECB 2010).

It is surprising that the ECB attaches such an importance to having sufficient equity. In fact, this insistence is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of central banking. The central bank creates its own IOUs. As a result it does not need equity at all to support its activities. Central banks can live without equity because they cannot default. The only support a central bank needs is the political support of the sovereign that guarantees the legal tender nature of the money issued by the central bank. This political support does not need any equity stake of the sovereign. In fact it is quite ludicrous to believe that governments that can, and sometimes do, default are needed to provide the capital of an institution that cannot default. Yet, this is what the ECB seems to have convinced the outside world.

All this would not be a problem were it not that the ECB’s insistence on having positive equity is in conflict with its responsibility to maintain financial stability. Worse, this insistence has become a source of financial instability. For example, in order to protect its equity, the ECB has insisted on obtaining seniority on its government bond holdings. In doing so, it has made these bonds more risky for the private holders, who have reacted by selling the bonds. This also implies that if the ECB were to take up its responsibility of lender of last resort, it will have to abandon its seniority claim on the government bonds it buys in the market.

What should be done?

The correct business model for the ECB is one that has it pursuing financial stability as its primary objective (together with price stability), even if that leads to losses. There is no limit to the size of the losses a central bank can bear, except the one that is imposed by its commitment to maintain price stability. In the present situation the ECB is far from this limit (Buiter 2008).

The creation of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the ESM has been motivated by the overriding concern of the ECB to protect its balance sheet. This has been misguided. The enlarged responsibilities that are now given to the ESM are to be seen as a cover-up of the failure of the ECB to take up its responsibility of the guardian of financial stability in the Eurozone; a responsibility that only the ECB can fulfil.

Es más, segùn De Grauwe, el EFSF, y su sucesor el EMS, se han creado con el objeto de preservar el capital del BCE, en base a una idea totalmente absurda de un banco central. Al poner tantas obligaciones sobre tan limitados medios, y ser una de ellas abortar la especulación contra la deuda soberana, se está incitando a esa especulación que se dice frenar.

A veces me da por pensar que los mandatarios europeos son rematadamente tontos, mezquinos y cobardes, y que sus decisiones se hacen en contra de la economía más elemental. Esa es una de esas veces.

¿Cual debería ser la guía de un banco central, si quiere pensar en su supervivencia? En primer lugar, debe pensar en la calidad de sus "pasivos" que son potencialmente ilimitados, y eso se logra mediante una política a largo plazo de estabilidad de precios. Entonces la gente tendrá dinero sin pensar en que se va a devaluar. Por otro lado, ese mismo principio le debe llevar a pensar en la estabilidad financiera, que si se rompe lleva a profundas depresiones y caídas de precios. Recuperar la estabilidad de precios es, en este caso, opuesto al anterior, convencer a la gente de que no atesore dinero bajo el colchón. Para ello debe aumentar la oferta de dinero - del que dispone ilimitadamente- hasta que el publico se convence de que nunca faltará dinero en circulación. Su capital es, por tanto, la confianza de la gente en él, pero la confianza en ambas circunstancias adversas. Y no el capital contable que no significa nada.

Soy escéptico de que alguna vez se cambie eso.