"How can I know what I think until I read what I write?" – Henry James


There are a few lone voices willing to utter heresy. I am an avid follower of Ilusion Monetaria, a blog by ex-Bank of Spain economist (and monetarist) Miguel Navascues here.
Dr Navascues calls a spade a spade. He exhorts Spain to break free of EMU oppression immediately. (Ambrose Evans-Pritchard)

domingo, 17 de agosto de 2014

El problema de Italia es nuestro problema

El problema de Italia es nuestro problema. Italia ha vuelto a caer en recesión, inmediatamente después de un fugaz trimestre de crecimiento positivo

( Algunos Dirán que España no es Italia, que España crece. Ja.)

El gráfico lo he tomado del blog de Edward Hugh. Que hace un interesante recorrido por los problemas de Italia, sin olvidar recovecos oscuros que casi nadie se molesta en buscar, como las relaciones del primer ministro (Renzi) con Draghi, los fallidos intentos de aquél de convencer a los acreedores (Alemania) que está pensando en serio en reformar la economía, etc.

Por supuesto, las reformas que le exigen son la de la austeridad y el mercado laboral. Pero Italia, aprendemos en el blog citado, lleva nada menos que desde 1999 con superávit fiscal primario, lo que no ha conseguido limitar el curso de la deuda. La deuda se acerca al 140% del PIB. Con un PIB que no despega -ahora mismos es igual al del 2000-, y una inflación cero o negativa, es imposible manejar la deuda/PIB.

Digo que el problema de Italia es el nuestro, porque de Europa sólo emanan recomendaciones perversas de políticas de oferta que no tienen nada que hacer aquí y ahora. Los intentos de Italia de tener un superávit primario -cosa que España no ha logrado hasta ahora- son contraproducentes para el crecimiento y el empleo. El problema es de demanda, y lo malo es que los listos de los economistas oficiales y oficiosos (todos le deben algo a alguien) no se dan cuenta que no son problemas transitorios. Como nos muestra Hugh, Italia tiene un envejecimiento de la población agravado porque los que no tiene empleo se van a buscarlo fuera.

Es decir, sí, el envejecimiento tiene otros causas, pero inequívocamente se ve agravado por el desplome de la demanda. Todo lo que se haga para mejorar la oferta laboral, son demanda suficiente, va a ir a beneficio del paso que acoge a esta gente. Pues nada, sigamos cantando las excelencias de la política de oferta.

Toma ya, ¿un problema de demanda condicionando la oferta del futuro? Sí, mendrugo. Esto es así porque la crisis ha roto el débil patrimonio de los trabajadores, sobre todo si estaban pagando una hipoteca, y más si se ha quedado sin su trabajo regular y no ha conseguido otro, o uno 5 veces peor pagado y no indefinido. Pero como dice el PP, jódete, al que madruga dios le ayuda.

La deflación aumenta los derechos de loa acreedores, distorsiona el pagos de las deudas, y genera reacciones acumulativas negativas. Como dicen en "House of Debt",

What about lower consumer prices? Shouldn’t they make people want to spend? The answer again is no, and a decline in consumer prices may even make the problem worse. Lower prices are possible only if firms lower their costs—by reducing wages. However, a wage cut crushes indebted households who have debt burdens fixed in nominal terms. If an indebted household faces a wage cut while their mortgage payment remains the same, they are likely to cut spending even further. This leads to a vicious cycle in which indebted households cut

Pero aquí nos deciden que la caída de precios es cojonuda. Y me creo que se lo creen, porque su lectura preferida es LD.

Europa se está poniendo terrorífica. Nadie da un euro porque acierte de una puta vez en una política que no sea de seguir pegando patadas a la lata camino adelante. Con eso hemos recorrido 6 años, oye, ¿por qué no otros seis?

Pero veamos lo que dice Wolfgang Münchau, en su último artículo, precisamente dedicado a Italia. Una cita un poco larga, pero que vale la pena por el cabreo que demuestra un antiguo eurista.

The ECB is failing to deliver on its inflation target not because it has run out of instruments but because it has based its policy on a poorly performing economic model. The ECB never expects inflation to deviate from the target of just under 2 per cent. Yet each month inflation undershoots, and the ECB is apparently taken by surprise. Because it relies on inaccurate intelligence, the ECB has committed three errors over the years.

... Almost a year ago I argued in this column that the ECB should buy government bonds in proportion to the member states’ share in the central bank’s capital. I no longer think this would work. Sovereign yields are converging to zero in anticipation of deflation; they cannot fall much further. This policy would have been far more potent had it been applied at a time when inflation was still close to the target. By pussyfooting around with liquidity policies instead of acting on inflation, the ECB has signalled that it is safe to bet against the inflation target. That is what German bond yields are telling us.

To undo this would take some heavy lifting – much heavier than anything we have seen from the US Federal Reserve, the Bank of Japan or the Bank of England. I am not sure that the legal and political room for manoeuvre allows such an extreme response. Still, it is worth considering what this would entail.

... The ECB should starting buying equities and junk bonds. It should subsidise mortgages and consumer credit. It could fund an investment programme in transport infrastructure, energy networks and scientific research, by buying debt to fund such projects at zero interest rates. All these measures would be effective. Most would be illegal.

The one thing the central bank can do without any legal problems would be to drop the silly macroeconomic model – known as the Smets-Wouters model, after its authors – on which it has been relying for too long.

My guess is that the ECB will not do any of these things. It will continue blaming eurozone governments for not implementing structural reforms. Eventually, it will adopt a programme of asset purchases that is too small, which it will abandon prematurely at the first sign of recovery.

The result is that the eurozone will end up looking like Japan, but with one difference. Countries whose policy goes off track have nowhere to go. The member states of a monetary union have alternatives. By failing to deliver on its inflation target, the ECB could give member countries a good reason to leave the eurozone: they could have a better central bank. My advice to the ECB: do not let that happen.

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