Wofgang Münchau en "By protecting itself from losses, the ECB recognises the possibility of European sovereign default", sobre el QE de Draghi: ha hecho lo que ha podido. Pero la transferencia del riesgo a los BCN, y la presión para que la porque países vuelvan al equilibrio fiscal, enfrían el resultado.
My main concern is the effect on fiscal policy. German policy makers in particular consider QE inappropriate for the German economy because of its large savings surplus. The German media and the banking lobby portray QE as an assault on the German saver for the benefit of scheming Anglo-Saxon speculators, because it will probably lower interest rates further. Another point is that Germany’s retirement system — where pensions are not invested in the stock market, but in low-yielding government bonds — is not equipped for an environment in which interest rates are at zero for long periods.
Europhobes also feed the conspiracy theory of QE as a eurozone sovereign bond through the back door. Or they portray QE as a device to save southern European banks at the expense of northern European taxpayers. Such fears are irrational, of course. Those who hold them seem to favour permanent austerity: if government debt did not exist, it would not need to be bought by a central bank.
I would therefore expect the German establishment to force the eurozone on to a path of permanent fiscal surpluses. The monetary relaxation by the ECB would be compensated for — or possibly overcompensated for — by further fiscal tightening. If you are a monetarist, you might even welcome this. But then, you would presumably not have bothered with QE in the first place. You would have preferred a stimulatory helicopter drop — print money and send a big cheque to every citizen. If you are a Keynesian, you would be alarmed by any hint of further fiscal tightening and conclude that the overall effect is negative. In any case, neither scenario brings joy.
We are left with a programme to purchase less than 10 per cent of the outstanding stock of European debt. Of those purchases, 92 per cent will formally remain on national balance sheets. This is neither very large nor very risky. By protecting itself from losses in this way, the ECB has in effect officially recognised the existence of a non-trivial possibility of European sovereign default. This may have been a price worth paying to secure the acquiescence of Germany. But it is a price nonetheless. It might have been the best deal on offer. But it is no bazooka.
My main concern is the effect on fiscal policy. German policy makers in particular consider QE inappropriate for the German economy because of its large savings surplus. The German media and the banking lobby portray QE as an assault on the German saver for the benefit of scheming Anglo-Saxon speculators, because it will probably lower interest rates further. Another point is that Germany’s retirement system — where pensions are not invested in the stock market, but in low-yielding government bonds — is not equipped for an environment in which interest rates are at zero for long periods.
Europhobes also feed the conspiracy theory of QE as a eurozone sovereign bond through the back door. Or they portray QE as a device to save southern European banks at the expense of northern European taxpayers. Such fears are irrational, of course. Those who hold them seem to favour permanent austerity: if government debt did not exist, it would not need to be bought by a central bank.
I would therefore expect the German establishment to force the eurozone on to a path of permanent fiscal surpluses. The monetary relaxation by the ECB would be compensated for — or possibly overcompensated for — by further fiscal tightening. If you are a monetarist, you might even welcome this. But then, you would presumably not have bothered with QE in the first place. You would have preferred a stimulatory helicopter drop — print money and send a big cheque to every citizen. If you are a Keynesian, you would be alarmed by any hint of further fiscal tightening and conclude that the overall effect is negative. In any case, neither scenario brings joy.
We are left with a programme to purchase less than 10 per cent of the outstanding stock of European debt. Of those purchases, 92 per cent will formally remain on national balance sheets. This is neither very large nor very risky. By protecting itself from losses in this way, the ECB has in effect officially recognised the existence of a non-trivial possibility of European sovereign default. This may have been a price worth paying to secure the acquiescence of Germany. But it is a price nonetheless. It might have been the best deal on offer. But it is no bazooka.
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