La verdad es la verdad, la diga Agamemnon o su porquero

Hace poco dediqué un post -"¿A quién beneficia la caída del euro?"- a explicar que la depreciación del euro beneficia mas a Alemania que a los países "estresados" (PIIGS). Pues eso mismo dice Bernanke en su nuevo blog recién estrenado.

(Aprovecho la ocasión para invitara ex gobernadores de tronío: Caruana, MAFO, próximamente Linde, a que abran un blog y cuenten sus cuitas. Invitación en balde, porque estos caballeros solo se mueven por dinero. Además, tendrían miedo de mostrar su aupina ingnorancia. Ítem mas, siempre confían ese menester, cuando no hay mas remedio, a un plumilla que le escriba el discurso. En realidad ya ni se acuerdan como se escribe, ni como se piensa.)

 
Parace mentira que tenga que venir un expresidente de la FED a decir algo sensato para que los paletos de este país de caridad de paletos (por ejemplo, Guindos) se enteren.
 
Bueno, pues al grano. Bernanke denuncia que el superávit creciente de Alemania es malo para el mundo, pero sobre todo para la EuroZona. Y que ese superávit se debe:
 
- A un tipo de cambio excesivamente devaluado para Alemania, aunque demasiado elevado para España & al.
- A una poliítica interna demasiado ahorrativa, que se traduce en un ahorro exterior creciente Frente al mundo, e, irremediablemente, a una deuda creciente exterior del resto del Mundo, incluida España.
 
Con exquisita educación (pese a lo cual la admonición sentará a cuerno quemado el norte del Rin), Bernanke le dice a Alemania que hago algo YA para cambiar eso, que es insano.
 

Persistent imbalances within the euro zone are also unhealthy, as they lead to financial imbalances as well as to unbalanced growth. Ideally, declines in wages in other euro-zone countries, relative to German wages, would reduce relative production costs and increase competitiveness. And progress has been made on that front. But with euro-zone inflation well under the European Central Bank’s target of “below but close to 2 percent,” achieving the necessary reduction in relative costs would probably require sustained deflation in nominal wages outside Germany—likely a long and painful process involving extended high unemployment.

Systems of fixed exchange rates, like the euro union or the gold standard, have historically suffered from the fact that countries with balance of payments deficits come under severe pressure to adjust, while countries with surpluses face no corresponding pressure. The gold standard of the 1920s was brought down by the failure of surplus countries to participate equally in the adjustment process. As the IMF also recommended in its July 2014 report, Germany could help shorten the period of adjustment in the euro zone and support economic recovery by taking steps to reduce its trade surplus, even as other euro-area countries continue to reduce their deficits.

Germany has little control over the value of the common currency, but it has several policy tools at its disposal to reduce its surplus—tools that, rather than involving sacrifice, would make most Germans better off. Here are three examples.

1. Investment in public infrastructure. Studies show that the quality of Germany’s infrastructure—roads, bridges, airports—is declining, and that investment in improving the infrastructure would increase Germany’s growth potential. Meanwhile, Germany can borrow for ten years at less than one-fifth of one percentage point, which, inflation-adjusted, corresponds to a negative real rate of interest. Infrastructure investment would reduce Germany’s surplus by increasing domestic income and spending, while also raising employment and wages.
2. Raising the wages of German workers. German workers deserve a substantial raise, and the cooperation of the government, employers, and unions could give them one. Higher German wages would both speed the adjustment of relative production costs and increase domestic income and consumption. Both would tend to reduce the trade surplus.
3. Germany could increase domestic spending through targeted reforms, including for example increased tax incentives for private domestic investment; the removal of barriers to new housing construction; reforms in the retail and services sectors; and a review of financial regulations that may bias German banks to invest abroad rather than at home.

Pero lean directamente a Bernanke, que es uno de los economistas más claros escribiendo. Lo que me hace gracia es imaginarme a un alto cargo de los que pululan por aquí, primero, pensado por su cuenta esto, y depués, escribirlo y publicarlo.

 
Pues no, es imaginable. Aquí somos todos serviles, de "trágala, tragala, tragala"... Todos tenemos fe en Alemania y dicen que son Liberales... ¿Qué querrán decir con eso? Porque Bernanke si que es liberal, co*o*nes, de verdad, y no de salón perfumado, como esperanza Aguirre, que para ella liberal es bajar los impuestos... Los que ella no quiere pagar.