"How can I know what I think until I read what I write?" – Henry James


There are a few lone voices willing to utter heresy. I am an avid follower of Ilusion Monetaria, a blog by ex-Bank of Spain economist (and monetarist) Miguel Navascues here.
Dr Navascues calls a spade a spade. He exhorts Spain to break free of EMU oppression immediately. (Ambrose Evans-Pritchard)

viernes, 3 de abril de 2015

Grecia, decidida a no cumplir plazos debidos

Grecia, decidida a incumplir el primer vencimiento debido al FMI este mes. Después de un periodo de unas semanas, el FMI declarará  a Grecia en Default (lo que no ha hecho ningún Pais desarrollado) y la UE la suspenderá los pagos suspendidos y exigirá la devolución de los fondos desembolsados en el rescate. (Nuestros insignes medios no se han enterado)
Grecia emitirá una moneda necesariamente de circulacion interna, porque nadie aceptará ser pagado con ella (recuérdese: dinero es lo que la gente acepta como dinero). Los primeros en ser abonados con ella, funcionarios y pensionistas, no tendrán acceso a muchos bienes, en todo caso bienes internos. Esto enrarecerá la oferta de bienes de primera necesidad, habrá mercado negro y seguramente tenían que imponer una especie de cartilla de racionamiento. La Banca habrá ser nacionalizada para que no siga siendo la tubera por donde salen los euros de Grecia a borbotones,

Grecia se ha llenado la boca de grandilocuencia, mientras seguía con sus planes de aumentar el salario mínimo y mantener el programa electoral, pese a la evidente falta creciente de recursos.

La retórica de Syriza puede que enardezca a sus electores, pero la verdad es que los que tienen un puñado de euros lo esconden o lo sacan del país. Puede que Eueopa sea una madrastra, pero Varoufakis y cía han demostrado saber muy poco de economía. Ahora su pueblo las va a pasar canutas, hasta que se monten ayudas especiales para los damnificados griegos. Porque ese será el resultado de los escasos días de gloria de Varoufakis.

A Evans-Pritchard (@AmbroseEP)
Spot of bother in Greece. Coming to a head, or negotiating tactics. We'll find out soon.
telegraph.co.uk/finance/econom…

Greece is drawing up drastic plans to nationalise the country's banking system and introduce a parallel currency to pay bills unless the eurozone takes steps to defuse the simmering crisis and soften its demands. 
Sources close to the ruling Syriza party said the government is determined to keep public services running and pay pensions as funds run critically low. It may be forced to take the unprecedented step of missing a payment to the International Monetary Fund next week. 
Greece no longer has enough money to pay the IMF €458m on April 9 and also to cover payments for salaries and social security on April 14, unless the eurozone agrees to disburse the next tranche of its interim bail-out deal in time...
... Bank of America warned that a “critical sequence of events could unfold” once Greece misses a payment to the IMF. It would trigger a parallel default to the eurozone bail-out fund (EFSF) under the legal master agreement, and might force the EFSF to cancel its loan packages and demand immediate repayment. This in turn would trigger a default on Greek government bonds issued under the bail-out accord. 
The situation is now critical. Even if Greece manages to cobble together enough money to cover the April deadline, it owes the IMF a further €200m on May 1 and €763m on May 12. A Greek official told EMU counterparts at a teleconference on Wednesday that the country has run out of money. "There is no way we can go beyond April 9," the official reportedly said. 
The drama comes after the creditors refused to rubber stamp Athens' latest bid to unlock funds, raising objections over Syriza plans to boost union powers in collective bargaining and boost pensions for lower income groups.

De Tyler Durden:

As a reminder, here is Goldman’s take on what redenomination would mean for Greece: 
Secluded from international capital markets, Greece would not be able to issue a globally traded currency 

With senior liabilities outstanding, Greece would be secluded from international capital markets. This would not just hold for the Greek government. It is likely that the implications touch the Greek private sector too, with Greek exporters and importers not being able to rely on letters of credit provided by Greek institutions. 

In such a case, Greek trade would collapse to the level that can be sustained by cash businesses in Euros.

Should a Greek currency be introduced following failure to pay, it would likely have very limited convertibility into Euros outside Greece. It would purely be a means of internal transactions, in all likelihood.

But is this an equilibrium solution for Greece? No. Because in such an event, it would be hard to convince even the Greeks to hold any drachmas. Put simply, while public sector employees, pensioners and government supply providers would be paid in drachmas (and be expected to pay part of their tax liabilities in the new currency), they would not be able to use that currency to buy imported goods. 

Exported goods would also become too valuable to be bought in drachmas, as they would correspond to hard currency receivables. Anticipating this, even providers of domestic services (taxi drivers, hairdressers etc) would avoid receiving payments in drachmas if possible.

If at all, the drachma would trade at a huge discount to the Euro. The economy would remain largely euro-ised but without a natural source of Euro-liquidity...

Ultimately as we discuss in our note with Huw Pill, it would be very hard for Greece to introduce a viable new currency unilaterally. Baring the complications of actually printing a new note, such a move would likely lead to a collapse in Greece’s international transactions and trade (both for the government and the private sector), would expose the country to litigation risks and trigger a significant destabilization of the banking system.

The only function of such a new currency would be to “tax” parts of the population that would not naturally receive hard currency as part of their payments structure. But that tax would not lead to a natural increase in government receivables as the economy (both the internal and the external economy) would shrink in a downward spiral.
So now, just as we predicted two weeks ago, Goldman (and anyone else who had effectively ruled out the possibility that Greece would finally reach a breaking point and fire up long-dormant national printing presses) may have to revise and rethink their assessment as the final curtain looks set to fall on the long-running tragicomedy that is the Greco-Euro standoff. 

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