"How can I know what I think until I read what I write?" – Henry James


There are a few lone voices willing to utter heresy. I am an avid follower of Ilusion Monetaria, a blog by ex-Bank of Spain economist (and monetarist) Miguel Navascues here.
Dr Navascues calls a spade a spade. He exhorts Spain to break free of EMU oppression immediately. (Ambrose Evans-Pritchard)

domingo, 8 de noviembre de 2015

El modelo de inestabilidad financiera: claridad no es simplicidad

Hyman Minsky desarrolló un modelo de inestabilidad de la economía, enfrentándose a la doxa oficial de entonces (y ahora) que prescribe la economía como un sistema que tiende al equilibrio, aunque de vez en cuando sufra recesiones. Las recesiones y recuperaciones son fluctuaciones en torno a una tendencia a largo plazo siempre ascendente, que depende de la población, el capital invertido, y la tecnología. Se supone que el ahorro es igual a la inversión, por lo que el ahorro nacional es bueno.
Minsky nos resume en ese documento una visión más fresca y grata, por ser más acorde con los experiencia histórica, aunque no con la economía ortodoxa. El mundo académico rechazó de plano el modelo de Minsky, que podría haber sido muy útil para prevenir la crisis de 2008. Nótese que el artículo (absolutamente imprescindible) es de 1992, cuando empezaba la supuesta "Great Moderation". Leyendo a Minsky, simplemente esa Era de diez años en la que todos se felicitaban por un crecimiento continuo sin inflación, empezando por Greenspan, debió haber despertado todas las alarmas.

El punto de partida de Minaky es el modelo de Keynes, algo más complejo que el modelo neoclásico-monetarista que por entonces y ahora dominaba la ortodoxia. Keynes:
There is a multitude of real assets in the world which constitutes our capital wealth - buildings, stocks of commodities, goods in the course of manufacture and of transport, and so forth. The nominal owners of these assets, however, have not infrequently borrowed money (Keynes' emphasis) in order to become possessed of them. To a corresponding extent the actual owners of wealth have claims, not on real assets, but on money. A considerable part of this financing takes place through the banking system, which interposes its guarantee between its and its borrowing customers to whom it loans money wherewith to finance the purchase of real assets. The interposition of this veil of money between the real asset and the wealth owner is an especially marked characteristic of the modern world."(p.l51)
Minsky: This Keynes "veil of money" is different from the Quantity Theory of money "veil of money." The Quantity Theory "veil of money" has the trading exchanges in commodity markets be of goods for money and money for goods: therefore, the exchanges are really of goods for goods. The Keynes veil implies that money is connected with financing through time. A part of the financing of the economy can be structured as dated payment commitments in which banks are the central player. The money flows are first from depositors to banks and from banks to firms: then, at some later dates, from firms to banks and from banks to their depositors. Initially, the exchanges are for the financing of investment, and subsequently, the exchanges fulfill the prior commitments which are stated in the financing contract.
In a Keynes "veil of money" world, the flow of money to firms is a response to expectations of future profits, and the depositors who lend it money, Thus, in a capitalist economy the past, the present, and the future are linked not only by capital assets and labor force characteristics but also by financial relations. The key financial relationships link the creation and the ownership of capital assets to the structure of financial relations and changes in this structure. Institutional complexity may result in several layers of intermediation between the ultimate owners of the communities' wealth and the units that control and operate the communities' wealth.
Esta complejidad, no recogida en los modelos macroeconómicos al uso (véase a Janet Yellen justificando una subida de tipos de interés en diciembre por el estado de la economía real), rechaza el típico choque externo de los modelos al uso como causa de las crisis (modelos actuales DSGE, en los que las perturbaciones son causadas por productividad). La economía capitalista es endógenamente inestable a partir de cierto punto.
The financial instability hypothesis is a model of a capitalist economy which does not rely upon exogenous shocks to generate business cycles of varying severity. The hypothesis holds that business cycles of history are compounded out of (i) the internal dynamics of capitalist economies, and (ii) the system of interventions and regulations that are designed to keep the economy operating within reasonable bounds.
¿Qué punto? el punto en que la economía pasa de ser financieramente "Hedged" (las deudas se devuelven con los beneficios del capital productivo) a una economía especulativa y luego a una economía "ponzi". Una economía puede estar durante mucho tiempo en equilibrio, mientras haya una coordinación entre el sector real y el sector financiero: las deudas de los empresarios con las que han pagado la inversión se devuelven con cargo a beneficios.

Ahora bien, esta misma estabilidad puede adormecer la vigilancia de las autoridades, que además creen en el equilibrio al que tienden ala acciones de todos los agentes. Es fácil que de este estadio se pase imperceptiblemente a los dos siguientes, por el efecto sedación sobre la estimación del riesgo en un mundo son inflación y pleno empleo (segundo teorema de la hipótesis de la inestabilidad).
The second theorem of the financial instability hypothesis is that over periods of prolonged prosperity, the economy transits from financial relations that make for a stable system to financial relations that make for an unstable system.
In particular, over a protracted period of good times, capitalist economies tend to move from a financial structure dominated by hedge finance units to a structure in which there is large weight to units engaged in speculative and Ponzi finance. Furthermore, if an economy with a sizeable body of speculative financial units is in an inflationary state, and the authorities attempt to exorcise inflation by monetary constraint, then speculative units will become Ponzi units and the net worth of previously Ponzi units will quickly evaporate. Consequently, units with cash flow shortfalls will be forced to try to make position by selling out position. This is likely to lead to a collapse of asset values.
A ello contribuye la esencia de la actividad bancaria, basada como la empresa en la busca de beneficios, pero de forma y efectos harto diferentes:
The financial instability hypothesis, therefore, is a theory of the impact of debt on system behavior and also incorporates the manner in which debt is validated. In contrast to the orthodox Quantity Theory of money, the financial instability hypothesis takes banking seriously as a profit-seeking activity. Banks seek profits by financing activity and bankers. Like all entrepreneurs in a capitalist economy, bankers are aware that innovation assures profits. Thus, bankers (using the term generically for all intermediaries in finance), whether they be brokers or dealers, are merchants of debt who strive to innovate in the assets they acquire and the liabilities they market. This innovative characteristic of banking and finance invalidates the fundamental presupposition of the orthodox Quantity Theory of money to the effect that there is an unchanging "money" item whose velocity of circulation is sufficiently close to being constant: hence, changes in this money's supply have a linear proportional relation to a well defined price level.
En suma, frente a los modelo de equilibrio general de los DSGE, que son la base de las decisiones de los bancos centrales, el mundo real es bastante más complejo y dislocado. Eso se debe al sector financiero, que por una parte es el que permite realizar inversiones a largo plazo inciertas, pero que cuando cuajan son beneficiosas para todos, por sus efecto en el aumento de la renta.

Si Minsky tiene razón, el modelo de compresión actual de la macro es demasiado simple. Que los bancos centrales tengan por misión solo moderar la inflación (y el pleno empleo en el caso de EEUU), es obviar que la economía capitalista se financia, que hay deudas, que hay incertidumbre, y que hay altibajos de las expectativas de los inversores, inevitablemente subjetivas. La estabilidad a a vigilar teqlmenete importante no es la inflación. Es el sistema financiero.

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