Pedrito y el lobo

Gavyn Davies explica por qué la reacción de los mercados al Secuester de Washington no ha sido estruendosa. Hay varias razones, entre las que me convencen éstas: primero, es muy costoso cubrirse de un riesgo que otras veces se ha producido y luego ha acabado en nada. Ese coste, si luego no hay evento, es un lastre frente a los competidores que no se han cubierto. Por eso los mercados suelen reaccionar tarde y con exceso. Sólo si todos las entidades ven el riesgo y acuden todas a cubrirse (comprando derivados, seguros, y vendiendo carteras), entonces ninguna se priva de hacer lo que hacen las demás. Pero mientras este riesgo se valore en comparación con los que pasó en 1995, no habrá reacciones notables. Todos esperan que al final los políticos rectifiquen en interés propio.

Martin Wolf dice que las consecuencias para EEUU de un cierre de las emisiones federales el día 17 podrían ser catastróficas.

De su artículo tomó prestada la imagen y el siguiente te párrafo:

Now consider the debt ceiling. According to Goldman, without an increase in the ceiling, the Treasury would no longer be able to issue debt from October 17 and would deplete its cash by the end of the month. Much confusion exists about what would happen if the Treasury ran out of cash and could not increase its outstanding debt. The optimistic view is that it could meet its priorities, including debt service, by managing its payments. If so, no default need occur. Jack Balkin of Yale University argues just this. The pessimistic view is that managing its cash flows in such a way would be illegal and possibly impossible – not least because cash receipts fluctuate substantially. But the Treasury, playing a game of chicken, would argue the pessimistic case even if it believed it could cope.

At best, a failure to raise the debt ceiling would necessitate a sharp cut in spending. At worst, the US would default. Analysts at Bank of America Merrill Lynch argue that hitting the ceiling would require the US to balance its budget at once, cutting spending by about 20 per cent, or 4 per cent of GDP. That would push the US into another recession – even if there were no default. The consequences of an actual default, particularly one that lasted for some time, are beyond prediction. Unlike a shutdown, there is no precedent, for good reason. The notion is suicidal.

So what should the administration do? In a democracy, people overturn laws by winning elections, not by threatening the closure of government or even an outright default. It is impossible to run the government of a serious country under blackmail threats of this kind. Every time the administration gives in, it stores up more difficulty for itself. It has to stop doing so. Some argue that the 14th amendment of the constitution, which states that “the validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law ... shall not be questioned”, gives the president the power he needs to borrow, in order to redeem debt. But such a presidential action would be risky. The Supreme Court might side with the president, but a constitutional crisis could itself impair US ability to borrow on favourable terms. Again, the clever proposal to mint a trillion-dollar coin and use that as security at the Federal Reserve might also cause mayhem.

El juego de Pedrito y el lobo se va desgastando. (Aquí podríamos citar la famosa "Crítica de Lucas", que al final la gente le pilla el truco a la estrategia del banco central y la incorpora a su modelo de comportamiento.) A la enésima vez la gente no hace caso a Pedrito, pero el lobo sí viene. Los políticos americanos, esta vez, han invertido un gran esfuerzo en figurar ante la opinión pública como irresponsables absolutos; todo el mundo cuenta con que cambiarán sus posiciones en el último minuto, pero resulta cada vez más difícilwrder la cara sin consecuencias electorales. Por lo tanto, no debemos esperar que la sensatez se imponga.