Consecuencias del Grexit

Mohamed El-Arian, sobre la probable salida de Grecia. Es destacable que El -Erian da como casi seguro el Grexit. Un resumen del artículo sería:

La UE tiene capacidades disponibles para hacer frente a los eventuales contagios en los mercados. Pero debería aprender de sus propios errores que han propiciado esta crisis. Es interesante la exposición de los problemas de toda índole que surgirán, así como la de los errores cometidos por una y otra parte. Si no se vuelven a cometer los mismos errores con otros países de la Zona, el proyecto europeo saldrá reforzado, en su opinión.

 Yo creo que, al menos políticamente, la UE podría salir reforzada. Pero para consolidar esa ganancia, debe cambiar profundamente su gestión del Euro. El Euro es incompatible con 19 países soberanos, pero, a la vez, no soberanos monetariamente. Hasta ahora, las instituciones europeas han fracasado miserablemente en ese papel que los países le han subrogado (erróneamente). Hay que decir tambien que la UE no es compatible con una zona monetaria que deja fuera a 9 países, de los cuales uno, RU, quiere salir si no se renegociar ciertos aspectos básicos de los Tratados.

La UE es una extraña yuxtaposición de tratados con pretensión de carácter Constitucional e Irreversible, pero que han sido rechazados en referéndum por muchos países y no han sido sometidos a votación en otros. Lo malo es que ésta no ha sido una fase transitoria que se ha dejado atrás: los problemas que ha generado se han ido acumulando, y solo se les ha puesto parches que distan de ser definitivos. (Más sobre UE en "Europa enmarañada".)

El mayor problema sea quizás la creciente divergencia financiera entre el núcleo y al periferia: ésta acumula deudas que el núcleo guarda, en vez de gastarlo en los paises del Sur. Una fluidez en ambos sentidos de de los flujos de gasto corrientes y de capital sería condición imprescindible para equilibrar las balanzas económicas y sociales. Si no es así, el euro volverá a tener crisis recurrentes y alguna acabará, mas pongo que tarde, con él. Si Grecia no lo hace es porque su tamaño relativo es manejable. Pero un Grexit a la española, o a la italiana, sería probablemente definitivo. Y hasta ahora los líderes europeos no han mostrado mucha pasión por enmendar errores.

Aparte de eso, el artículo de El-Erian es una exposición muy clara de los problemas del Grexit, de los errores cometidos, y de lo que pasará después.

... The eurozone is in a much better place to handle the adverse spillovers of a possible Grexit than it has been before — especially at the time of the previous major scare in July 2012 —because of measures already taken.
A number of region-wide mechanisms have been put in place, including the European Financial Stability Facility and the European Stability Mechanism;
The ECB is implementing a large-scale balance sheet operation that can be easily and rapidly expanded;
The European Investment Bank is in a position to respond more rapidly; and
Individual countries — particularly the potentially more sensitive peripherals (such as Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) — have taken a series of steps at national level to limit their vulnerability to region-wide contagion.
... While the initial spike in peripheral risk spreads would probably be reversed in a relatively short period, in the post-Grexit equilibrium markets would price in a new risk factor associated with the first country leaving the monetary union; this would translate into higher borrowing costs. Meanwhile, the opposite downward pressure of yields in Germany, the true safe haven within the eurozone, would add to the complications for a growing number of sectors (such as insurance, pension and other providers of long-dated financial services) of ultra low and, in some cases, negative yields. There would also be renewed adverse effects for countries such as Denmark and Switzerland.
Survival is not the only likely outcome for the eurozone. This important and historical regional integration project could èven emerge stronger if it quickly takes on board some key lessons from the series of unfortunate miscalculations.
On its part, the Greek government massively under-estimated the extent to which its democratically elected government, with an explicit mandate of change, could impose itself on other members of the eurozone — especially given the history of broken promises and unmet commitments. Its modes of operation, including the unilateral public communication of interim negotiating stances, while remarkably transparent have proved politically quite naïve and disruptive, thus adding to the trust deficit.
Alexis Tsipras’s government also made a strategic blunder in taking a series of confrontational public stances, and doing so in a manner that fuelled increasingly vehement accusations and counter-accusations. Finally, it wrongly assumed that it would find influential support among other peripheral countries. Instead, having swallowed their own bitter medicine, the peripherals hesitated in expressing much sympathy for Greece and backing a more lenient approach.
European governments and the institutions also miscalculated. They were timid in their provision of debt relief early on. They were slow in recasting the austerity component once it became clear that the economic downturn would far exceed anything that they had envisaged. And they under-estimated the extent to which citizens, with access to ballot boxes, can and will rebel when they are not offered a clear light at the end of a long economic adjustment tunnel.
These are lessons that can, and should be learnt and acted on. They speak to a more effective, participatory and inclusive process in a possible post-Grexit world. Should Greece leave the single currency, , and the odds would favour this, the eurozone would do a lot more than navigate its exit without major long-term damage. It would also emerge stronger, benefiting both the region and the global economy as a whole.

Mohamed El-Erian is chief economic adviser to Allianz and chair of President Barack Obama’s Global Development Council