"How can I know what I think until I read what I write?" – Henry James
jueves, 11 de agosto de 2016
Panorama energético esperanzador
Valor y precio
En la siguiente tabla vemos sus principales métricas, comparadas con su sector y con el SP500 (sacadas de la web de morningstar):
pulse para ampliar
Los números son para echarse a temblar. ¿Estamos en una burbuja?
Algunos piensan que sí. Pero llevan unos años equivocándose, mientras Amazon se sigue multiplicando en bolsa.
Los que piensan que no, argumentan que Amazon está en fase de crecimiento, de engordar y arrasar cuota de mercado, con la idea de convertirse en imprescindible en nuestras vidas diarias, y que más adelante lo rentabilizará todo. Este es un modelo de negocio muy de moda en EEUU entre las empresas tecnológicas (y no digamos ya en las Biotech...). En algunos casos funciona, aunque no sabría decir si en general está funcionando. A Facebook por ejemplo, le ha salido bien y ha conseguido MONETIZAR su posición privilegiada, aunque hubo un tiempo (poco después de su salida a bolsa) en que el mercado tuvo dudas.
Eso me lo confirma la débil inversión empresarial (que incluye la inversión en innovación), que el segundo trimestre cayó, como veíamos en mi post "La debilidad inversionista en EEUU".
Es decir, las FANG tienen un margen de sobreprecio sobre sus previsibles ventas que es lo que explicaría en gran parte la distancia entre la bolsa y la economía real, más o menos. Es lo que dice Krugman, y Es lo que vengo diciendo hace tiempo. Entonces, no veo tan seguro que los mercados de EEUU no sufran una corrección. En todo caso, no es el momento de tirarse de cabeza a la piscina.
miércoles, 10 de agosto de 2016
Un ejemplo perfecto de imbecilidad andante, pero no bienintencionada
No pretende ni suplantar ni "dar la espalda" al euro. Ni falta que le hace para cumplir su objetivo. El jarama, la futura moneda local de Rivas-Vaciamadrid (85.000 habitantes), aspira a realizar una aportación muy valiosa a los vecinos y comerciantes de la zona: el "beneficio social". Así lo explica José Mayoral, el promotor del proyecto, que lleva ya varios meses presentándolo en charlas informales a vecinos y comerciantes para lograr lanzarlo con éxito en la fecha prevista. Para marzo, el objetivo principal es que al menos 50 tiendas de la localidad acepten jaramas como medio de pago. Cuando entre en circulación, la nueva moneda permitirá que la riqueza generada se quede en la localidad, a buen recaudo de las multinacionales, y sirva de acicate para que los vecinos piensen en acercarse al pequeño comercio antes de acudir a consumir a una gran superficie.¿Cómo van a conseguirlo? La idea es sencilla. Los ciudadanos pueden cambiar sus euros a la nueva moneda social y obtendrán 1,02 jaramas por cada euro. Estos euros quedarán en una cuenta de banca ética que se utilizará para ese fin, de forma que cada jarama esté siempre respaldado por un euro, y podrán gastarlos en los comercios que los acepten. Para conseguir que la moneda permanezca en circulación, si los jaramas no se gastan antes de tres meses, perderán un 1 por ciento de su valor. Por su parte, los comerciantes tendrán libertad para admitir el pago en línea con su estrategia comercial; es decir, decidirán qué bienes o servicios, y en qué circunstancias (por ejemplo, rebajas o 'happy hours), podrán cobrar en jaramas, siempre y cuando estas condiciones estén perfectamente claras y los precios sean exactamente los mismos en ambas monedas. Ellos, a su vez, podrán gastar los jaramas bien en proveedores para su negocio, creando una red de intercambios entre los propios negocios locales, o bien para sus gastos personales. De esta forma, el dinero permanecerá en circulación dentro de la comunidad local.
Pero ese no es el único objetivo del proyecto, que también pasa por generar riqueza destinada a financiar distintas iniciativas sociales en la zona, que serán elegidas por votación por los usuarios de la moneda. El dinero disponible será el resultado de la suma de las depreciaciones que sufran los jaramas acumulados durante más de tres meses por los usuarios (un céntimo por cada jarama, el equivalente a 0,01 euros) y del 'descuento' que se establecerá en el cambio inverso, es decir, por cambiar jaramas de nuevo a euros. Esta medida servirá también como acicate para mantener los jaramas en circulación y la cuantía, aún por determinar, dependerá, en el caso de los comerciantes, del beneficio social de su proyecto. Sin embargo, recuerda Mayoral, "hay una forma mejor de no perder dinero: encontrar proveedores que admitan el pago con jaramas".
El mito de la MMT. Los reyes magos no existen en economía
"Portento, enigma, para los historiadores de las ideas, que una doctrina tan ilógica y aburrida haya influido tanto tiempo en la mente de los hombres, y por esa vía, en los acontecimientos históricos..."
"Since I have spent quite a bit of time critiquing mainstream economics I have written this brief MMT critique in an attempt to clarify my own personal views and where I think a heterodox school like MMT goes wrong. I have attached some links here to critiques as well as a brief overview of my own thoughts that will help others avoid the mistake that I made. The following critiques are notable primarily because they’re by other Post Keynesian economists (MMT is a subset of Post-Keynesian Econ). There are some aspects of MMT that are very good, but MMT takes a basic Post-Keynesian framework and adds a bunch of “modern” understandings that result in inconsistencies. These critiques elaborate on those inconsistencies and caution readers against adhering too strictly to MMT views. MMT, like all other schools, is definitely worth understanding if for no other reason than it will open your mind to alternative views. So dive in and make up your own mind.
- MMT, The Emperor Still Has No Clothes, Thomas Palley
- The Monetary and Fiscal Nexus of NeoChartalism, by Marc Lavoie
- MMT and the Real World Accounting of 1-1<0, by Brett Feibiger
Here’s a shorter version of what I believe are the primary flaws in MMT:
1) MYTH: MMT states that a sovereign currency issuer need not fund itself via taxes or bond sales.
REALITY: Any endogenous issuer of money must “fund” itself.
This is one of the core underlying ideas in MMT, but it is obviously false once one understands endogenous money. In an endogenous money system anyone can issue money denominated in certain state based units of account. The state can legally attribute some credibility to certain forms of money, but it cannot force the private sector to accept these forms of money as having value.
... MMTers sometimes say things like “taxpayers do not fund anything”. But this is like saying that my income does not fund my spending so long as I can find willing holders of my debt.
... In this sense, it is rather meaningless to say that the state doesn’t “fund” its spending because just like any other liability issuer it most certainly needs to find willing holders of its liabilities. The state, just like all issuers of money, must be able to to find willing holders of its liabilities which means that, for all practical purposes, it most certainly funds the liability side of its balance sheet.
2) MYTH two: state money sits atop the hierarchy of money in the monetary system.
REALITY: Most modern governments have outsourced money creation to the private banking system placing it in the dominant settlement and payment role.
In placing state money at the top of their hierarchy MMT boxes itself into the same corner that the rest of exogenous money theories do. This creates a state centric theory of money that is not all that different from the money multiplier theory. The difference being that MMT phrases things differently and applies an endogenous banking system into their model. Instead of saying that state money is “multiplied” MMT will say that it is “leveraged”. These are just word games that are utilized to make the endogenous money understandings appear compatible with the State Theory of Money.
3) MYTH: MMT says that unemployment is caused by the deficit being too small.
REALITY: Unemployment is caused by a lack of private investment.
MMTers claim that small deficits cause unemployment. Warren Mosler, MMT’s founder says:
“Involuntary unemployment is evidence that the desired H(nfa) of the private sector exceeds theactual H(nfa) allowed by government fiscal policy.
To be blunt, involuntary unemployment exists because the federal budget deficit is too small.”
... defining “net saving” as (S-I) MMT confuses traditional economics which defines net saving as net disposable income less final consumption expenditure. This alternative MMT definition is both confusing and useless. It is based on little more than an accounting trick intended to mislead the reader into thinking that government deficits are more important than they necessarily are. This is how MMT makes their alternative reality appear realistic, however. By changing the definitions of well known terms they can make their inconsistencies appear consistent within this alternative reality.
4) MYTH: MMT says that “taxes drive money”
REALITY: Private output “drives money”
MMT claims that the government creates demand for its currency by imposing a tax on its users. They claim that this drives the desire to obtain currency and that this currency is ultimately paid back to the government in bank reserves. In establishing this point MMT claims that the government spends first and imposes a tax that generates the demand for this currency.
The ability to tax or charge fees is not unique to a government, however. All banks charge a tax on their loans when they charge you an interest rate. This involuntary fee helps to create demand for bank money. Should we now argue that banks, as the primary issuers of money, create demand for money because they charge fees? Of course not. The reason there is demand for bank money is because there is desire to consume/invest in private output. Most liabilities are issued with some form of involuntary obligation attached to them. The government is not unique in its ability to charge taxes/fees or impose obligations. We should not misconstrue this idea as being unique to government currency.
This is related to the MMT view that the government “spends first” and “taxes second”. They have even gone so far as to claim:
“it would be impossible to collect dollars from the private sector unless they had first been spent into existence by the public sector”
Of course, this point is demonstrably false. I can borrow from a bank and the government can collect taxes without ever having spent a dollar into existence. The government doesn’t need to spend a single dime in order for it to collect a tax on inside bank money.
MYTH # 5: MMT is a Post-Keynesian School
REALITY: MMT Agrees With Some Elements of Keynesian Economics, but is Closer to Marx
Over the years MMT has been associated with the Post-Keynesian school of economics which is a school that aligns itself closely with the original views of JM Keynes. Keynes, however, would not have agreed with much of MMT. As MMT co-founder Bill Mitchell has stated:
“There are MMT proponents, who while sympathetic with much of Post Keynesian theory, disagree on key propositions – specifically relating to debt and deficits (as an example). But then they also point to Keynes’ work as seminal in the development of MMT. My own view is that many of the important insights in Keynes were already sketched out in some detail in Marx.”
Keynes was a harsh critic of Marxian Socialism:
“Marxian Socialism must always remain a portent to the historians of Opinion – how a doctrine so illogical and so dull can have exercised so powerful and enduring an influence over the minds of men, and through them, the events of history.”
Las bondades del Euro (II)
Yo creo que hay una relación entre Maastritch, el robo de la soberanía monetaria, y la degradación de estos políticos. Nuestros políticos son inanes y superficiales porque poco pueden hacer en el gobierno. No pueden hacer estrategias monetarias y fiscales, que es lo que alimenta las ofertas electorales sensatas y/o con alcance. Antes de Maastritch se hicieron cosas realmente potentes, algunas malas, pero había palanca para hacerlas. La Reforma Industrial se hizo con resortes de poder para ofrecer compensaciones a los afectados, eso aparte de si estuvo bien o mal hecha. Yo creo que una gran parte era necesaria. Había que cerrar industrias obsoletas que costaban dinero al erario público. Y privado, naturalmente."Bien, a veces me he planteado las cosas desde ese prisma. Pero piensen uds si no ha contribuido la UE y el euro a que los políticos se irresponsabilicen y sean lo que son. Hasta 1992 estabamos en Europa, y gracias a eso hicimos cosas que parecían imposibles. Íbamos bien, pero el euro lo jodió todo económicamente. Maastritch fue el principio del fin. Al amputan un poder soberano tan importante, los gobiernos ya no tenían nada que hacer más que seguir las directrices de Europa. Literalmente, no podían hacer otra cosa. Un país soberano puede buscar una combinación monetaria y fiscal que satisfaga a la mayoría de sus ciudadanos, pero en una unidad monetaria no.Encima es una unidad a medias, incapaz de tomar las decisiones nacionales a nivel supranacional. Lo que queda en medio es un burocracia apoyada en los millones que piensan como uds, pero que es impotente. Miren Grecia, que tendrá otra crisis, seguro. Miren el caso de los refugiados.No somos una nación pero tampoco somos una unidad de naciones que saben lo que quieren hacer juntas. Cuando esto se atasque definitivamente, ¿qué ardid se tragaran para defender de nuevo al euro?Son uds cautivos del miedo, lo que comprendo, pero eso no les deja pensar en lo que da realmente miedo."
lunes, 8 de agosto de 2016
La debilidad inversionista en EEUU
So here’s my question: Is the modesty of the Clinton economic agenda too much of a good thing? Should accelerating U.S. economic growth be a bigger priority?
For while the U.S. has done reasonably well at recovering from the 2007-2009 financial crisis, longer-term economic growth is looking very disappointing. Some of this is just demography, as baby boomers retire and growth in the working-age population slows down. But there has also been a somewhat mysterious decline in labor force participationamong prime-age adults and a sharp drop in productivity growth. (Paul Krugman)
Crecimiento versus distribución
"All of this has changed. It is totally appropriate that widening inequality and the associated stalling of middle-class living standards should become an urgent political issue.
"What is unfortunate is that many people, in their eagerness to focus on fairness, neglect the single most important determinant of almost every aspect of economic performance: the rate of growth of total income, as reflected in the gross domestic product....
...The reality is that more growth means more employment. And with the college-graduate unemployment rate only 2.5 per cent, the newly employed are disproportionately less educated and disadvantaged.
"It can hardly be an accident that the decades of maximum growth, the 1960s and 1990s, also saw the most rapid job growth and most rapid increase in middle-class living standards.
"Growth provides the wherewithal for increased federal revenue and so encourages the protection of vital social insurance programmes such as Social Security and Medicare. It creates headroom for new initiatives such as expansions of the Earned Income Tax Credit.
"Tight labour markets are the best social programme, as they force employers to hire and mentor inexperienced people in order to be adequately staffed. Some years ago, I estimated that for each 1 per cent point increase in adult male employment, the employment of young black men rose 7 per cent. More recent research confirms economic growth has an outsized benefit for younger people and minorities...
... The reality is that if American growth continues to have a 2 per cent ceiling, it is doubtful that we will achieve any of our major national objectives.
If, on the other hand, we can boost growth to 3 per cent, interest rates will normalise, middle-class wages will rise faster than inflation, debt burdens will tend to melt away and the power of the American example will be greatly enhanced...
...The question is not whether business success is desirable. The question is how it can best be achieved. At a moment when capital costs are close to zero, the stock market is at a record high and businesses are earning record profit margins, we do not need to bribe businesses to make investments that now do not seem worthwhile to them.
There is no case for reducing already low corporate taxes or removing regulations unless it can be shown that these have costs in excess of benefits.
What is needed is more demand for the product of business. This is the core of the case for policy approaches to raising public investment, increasing workers’ purchasing power and promoting competitiveness.
That such policies also contribute to fairness is not a reason to lose sight of the central objective of promoting growth.
Often in economics there are trade-offs. But not always. We can and must promote both fairness and growth.
Incertidumbre, riesgo, y ciclos financieros
Uncertainty tends to turn long-term investment into short-term speculation. Denial of the need to guard against uncertainty allows what Keynes called the ‘financial circulation’ to expand exponentially at the expense of the ‘industrial circulation’. This has been happening everywhere –but notably in the UK, where the financial system has become master, not servant, of production, the royal road to paper wealth.Any reform of our present system will require restricting the role of finance, and adopting a highly sceptical attitude to the claims made on behalf of financial engineering. Keynes had little specific to say about financial regulation, since the banking system was not at the centre of the storm of the early 1930s; even in the United States it was an induced casualty. So it is not from Keynes that we should seek to learn the specifics of legislation or regulation for financial markets. Nevertheless, use of his theory can show up deficiencies in current thinking on financial reform. What distinguishes Keynes’s theory from today’s mainstream thinking on financial markets is the distinction he makes between risk and uncertainty. If financial markets are merely risky, the important reform is to develop better measures of risk and better techniques of risk management, and, if necessary, enforce them on financial institutions. If on the other hand there is bound to be irreducible uncertainty in financial operations, the state has an additional role, which is to protect the economy as a whole against the consequences of uncertainty. Within the risk-management paradigm there are two main approaches to reform. The first is to allow market forces to create more and better markets for risk –new derivative products, more extensive financial intermediation –in quest of the holy grail of ever more complete markets for contingencies. According to this view, the financial system is like an early aircraft. Just because it is prone to crash, we shouldn’t abandon the attempt to make it reliably airborne. This ignores Keynes’s distinction between risk and uncertainty. We simply cannot fit all the contingencies we face into a Gaussian bell curve, so there will always be a role for state policy to reduce uncertainty arising from finance.The alternative approach is to force better risk-management measures and techniques on financial institutions through regulation. This is the standpoint of Britain’s Financial Services Authority’s The Turner Review (March 2009). This identifies an ‘inadequate focus on the analysis of systemic risk and of the sustainability of whole business models: and a failure to design regulatory tools to respond to emerging systemic risks’.The nub of the argument is that risk-management methods did not adequately reflect the new risks created by the spread of derivatives. There are fleeting moments of doubt as to whether even improved risk-management techniques can make financial markets more ‘efficient’ in the sense of being able to price risks correctly. ‘Recent events’, the review notes, ‘have raised fundamental issues about the extent to which different markets are or can be made to be efficient, rational, and self-correcting. They suggest that there may be inherent limits to how far problems of market irrationality can be overcome by measures designed to make those markets more transparent, liquid and technically efficient’; and, in another place, ‘If liquid traded markets are inherently subject to herd/momentum effects, with the potential for irrational overshoots round rational economic levels, then optimal regulation cannot be based on the assumption that increased liquidity is always and in all markets beneficial.’ Except for stigmatizing as irrational all behaviour that doesn’t fit the classical model of rationality, this is the right issue to raise. Having delivered itself of these warnings, the review nevertheless concludes that the challenge to efficient market theory doesn’t require a ‘fundamental shift from the FSA’s current policy stance’. What it does require is regulation of system risk.The previous assumption was that if individual banks were safe, the financial system would be stable. But, in trying to make themselves safe under stress, banks can act in ways which undermine collective stability. The review emphasizes the need for increased flow and accuracy of information (‘transparency’) to be made available to market participants. External ‘stress tests’ should replace internal assessments of banks’ capital adequacy, to reduce banks’ vulnerability to solvency crises. ‘Dynamic’ accounting conventions should replace the static ones agreed at Basel II (2004), so that agents can anticipate future losses before they become evident in trading-book values or loan repayments. As part of its proposal for ‘dynamic’ accounting, the review suggests that banks create a non-distributable economic-cycle reserve, which would set aside profit in good years to anticipate losses arising in bad years. Bonuses should be based on distributable profit after the deduction of this reserve, thus ensuring that ‘such systems reflect a reasonable estimate of future possible credit losses and impairments, rather than a point-in-time calculation of profit which may subsequently prove illusory’.This proposal –similar to ‘balancing the budget over the cycle’ –of course assumes that cycles follow a Gaussian pattern. The Turner Review consistently rejects the radical option of reducing the scope of financial intermediation. This is because it continues to believe that the world of derivative instruments has, by diversifying risk, made the economy less shock-prone. It ignores the evidence from the present crisis that the diversification of risk can increase the danger of cumulative and self-reinforcing price movements. In sum, the review proposes a modest increase in regulation, chiefly by imposing higher information and capital-adequacy requirements on banks and other financial institutions, which should be made internationally effective. The review is worth special attention because it is by far the most able of the conventional responses to the slump, with reforms closely linked to diagnosis. It does not of course exhaust the proposals for taming finance. Other types of reform proposal are aimed at improving ‘corporate governance’. A familiar litany includes strengthening shareholder rights, increased disclosure and transparency requirements, better selection of board members, and so on. It is hard to be against measures to make the financial system less opaque.But, just as it is wrong to believe that asymmetric information was at the root of the financial breakdown, so it is a delusion to believer that more ‘transparency’ will prevent future breakdowns. For behind this thought lies the belief that all risk is calculable and that it's better directors, better regulation. Keynes’s distinction between risk and uncertainty led him in a different direction. Risk could be left to look after itself; the government’s job was to reduce the impact of uncertainty. Risky activities, Keynes implies, should be left to the market, with entrepreneurs being allowed to profit from good bets and to suffer the consequences of bad bets. On the other hand, uncertain activities with large impacts should be controlled by the state in the public interest. How to make this distinction operationally significant should be the major object of the reform of financial services in the aftermath of the crisis. One obvious application of this distinction is to banking reform. Here, the radical approach to reform is to reinstate the Glass–Steagall philosophy of separating ‘utility’ from ‘investment banking’, with retail banks –those which serve the public –allowed to take only moderate risks, leaving high-risk lending to the investment banks. The clear principle is that banks enjoying deposit insurance and access to lender-of-last-resort facilities should not indulge in gambling with depositors’ or taxpayers’ money; investment banks, which would be free to gamble with their investors’ money, should be debarred from accepting retail deposits, and excluded from any public bailouts. The logic is impeccable, but it would mean ensuring that no investment banks become ‘too large to fail’. This implies that, apart from Glass–Steagall, there needs to be some restriction on multinational banking. The alternative approach would allow retail and investment banking to be combined, as now, but would impose higher capital and liquidity requirements, which could be varied over the cycle. My own scepticism about the ability of the authorities successfully to carry out such ‘macro-prudential’ regulation leads me to favour a return to the Glass–Steagall philosophy of ‘narrow’ banking, which I would argue is desirable anyway on general social grounds. However, retail banking has also succumbed to the financial virus by abandoning prudent limits for lending. Both sellers and buyers of mortgages would be protected by limiting home loans to, say, 75% of the value of the property and three times the income of the borrower. This would reduce reliance on credit agencies. Except for the last, the reforms above would require international agreement to be effective.
domingo, 7 de agosto de 2016
Las "bondades" del Euro
Keynes: la libre competencia
Skidelsky resume la posición anti liberal de Keynes como,‘Suppose that by the working of natural laws individuals pursuing their own interests with enlightenment in conditions of freedom always tend to promote the general interest at the same time! Our philosophical difficulties are resolved… The political philosopher could retire in favour of the businessman –for the latter could always attain the philosopher’s summum bonum by just pursuing his own private profit.’‘The principle of the survival of the fittest could be regarded as a vast generalization of the Ricardian economics. Socialist interferences became, in the light of this grander synthesis, not merely inexpedient but impious, as calculated to retard the onward movement of the mighty process by which we ourselves had risen like Aphrodite from the primeval slime.’
Obsérvese que se refiere a algunas parcelas de la economía, no todas. Dinero, crédito, diseminación de la información, para elidir males como riesgo, incertidumbre e ignorancia."Keynes then develops what is essentially a public-goods argument for state intervention. Each age must ‘distinguish afresh the Agenda of government from the non-Agenda’. Services which are technically social must be separated from those which are technically individual, the most important new items on the agenda being control of currency and credit; dissemination of information to remedy the evils arising from ‘risk, uncertainty, and ignorance’; collective decision concerning the allocation of capital between home and foreign investment; and a population policy paying attention to quality as well as numbers."
España cañí
sábado, 6 de agosto de 2016
Río, no Madrid. La maldición olímpica de los JJOO
Olympics, the award of the games to an emerging world city tends to be a sign that a watershed has been reached. Rio is the fourth emerging city to be awarded the games. Like its three predecessors — Mexico in 1968, Seoul in 1988 and Beijing in 2008 — it won the games aftéer a long period of sustained growth. The games recognised that growth. And in every previous case, the Olympiad was the cue for that growth to stall or slow, followed in Korea and Mexico by crises, and in China by what look like desperate measures to avert one.
In this way, the Olympics function like magazine covers. Just as an appearance on Sports Illustrated’s means that an athlete has peaked, or on a business magazine means a stock has topped out, so winning the games signals that the period of growth is “in the price” and it is time for a decline.
In Brazil’s case the hex seems to have applied when it won the games, in October 2009. That was almost the exact top of the Brazilian stock market. Over the seven prior years, Brazil’s Bovespa index had outperformed the FTSE All-World index by more than 300 per cent. In the six-plus years since then, it has underperformed by almost 70 per cent, as commodity prices have turned down, and the inefficiencies in Brazil’s economy have been cruelly revealed. Now the anger among Brazilians suggests catharsis and a market bottom.
Mireia en Río
viernes, 5 de agosto de 2016
Tiempo de Helicopter Money
jueves, 4 de agosto de 2016
Bolsas y bonos, casas y oro
Irlanda ¿dónde está el truco?
¿Cómo es posible? bueno, Parece que hay "problemas" de Contabilidad Nacional, o de doble contabilidad, si lo he entendido. Irlanda es el país con más inversión directa extranjera por metro cuadrado, y no ha encontrado el sistema para evitar dobles contabilizaciones de beneficios de estas compañías que se envían al país de origen, pero por alguna razón se contabilizan en Irlanda.
La renta empresarial se divide entre beneficios y salarios. Eso es lo que va al PIB. Si el beneficio exportado al país de origen de la multinacional, debe restarse del PIB como salida de de renta. En definitiva, ese 26% no es disfrutado por los irlandeses.
En el país encontramos un artículo dedicado al tema, según un informe oficial
En fin, ue si en 2016 llegaron muchas compañías de esas y fuera n declaradas residentes, es decir, internas, empieza el lío contable."Según ese documento, la marcada subida del PIB se debió a factores circunstanciales, como las actividades de compañías de arrendamiento de aviones, que, en algunos casos, llegaron a domiciliar sus multimillonarios balances de cuentas en Irlanda durante el pasado año.
"Asimismo, un número de multinacionales, sobre todo del sector tecnológico, han movido a la isla parte de sus activos, entre otros los relacionados con las patentes, para aprovechar los beneficios fiscales que ofrece el Ejecutivo de Dublín, lo que ha contribuido a inflar las cifras, confirmó hoy Kenny."
Una solución es mirar el PNB, o producto nacional bruto, el que se hace con los factores nacionales y por ende excluye los factores aportados desde fuera... Pero no del todo, señal de que hay beneficios exportados que siguen adjudicados a factores internos."According to the rules of national accounting, a subsidiary of a multinational in another country is only cosnidered a subsidiary if it’s not a postbox company but if it also owns for instance some real estate. The headquarters of some very large multinationals have been relocated to Dublin and employ as far as I know a few hundred employees and presumably own some real estate…. The profits of ordinary subsidiaries are relocated to the country of origin of the multinational, in an accounting sense. The profits of these multinationals (think: microsoft) are as these are not ordinary subsidiaries but headquarters (at least legally) relocated from (in the microsoft case) the USA to Ireland, This runs havoc with all the ,normal’ GDP ratio’s like labour income (which drops like a stone when expressed as a % of GDP but which rises in a nominal sense). There are arguments to relocate the profits of subsidiaries to the parent country. The rules take account of this. But Ireland is a topsy turvy case: multinationals are not establishing a subsdiary in Ireland but are (legally) relocating their headquarters! This was presumably not foreseen by the GDP statisticians; imo the rules have to be changed to take account of this topsy turvy case."